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One of the major causes for the failure of Management
Information Systems (MIS) is that they do not satisfy the
users' information requirements. This, in turn, is most
often caused by the fact that those requirements are
difficult to obtain accurately and completely. Simply
"asking" the user what he needs is inadequate. This thesis
reviews the Information Requirements Analysis (IRA)
literature, briefly describing some of the techniques
available for determining the users' information
requirements. It then reports on a survey which attempted
to investigate the degree to which the extensive MIS
literature involving information requirements determination
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INTRODUCTION, DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM, AND TECHNIQUES

I. INTRODUCTION
When computers first came on the scene, they were used
almost solely to perform clerical tasks, for example,
tabulating a census, performing complex scientific
calculations, processing sales orders, and logging
transactions such as those associated with accounts
receivable and accounts payable. As the technology evolved,
it became evident that the computer had the ability to do
more than just perform such clerical tasks; ' it could
extract information from data and present this information
to managers in such a way as to assist these managers in
performing their jobs.\ Hence, the birth of what are often
called Management Information Systems (MIS). The MIS
concept created quite a stir in data processing circles at
first because of the fantastic potential it held for
revolutionizing the way business was done and decisions were
made. When the initial smoke cleared, however, it became
sadly apparent that MIS had not achieved its potential.
[Refs. 1,2] The managers which these information systems
were designed to serve just did not find their outputs as
useful as had once been expected.
What went wrong? Most authorities on the subject




(1) Managers simply expected too much initially because
they did not really understand the capabilities and
limitations of computers. These expectations were
undoubtedly spawned, at least in part, by over-enthusiastic
data processing (DP) professionals who went overboard in
describing the "amazing things" their machines could do.
(2) In the course of trying to ensure that the manager
had all the information he needed, and possibly to justify
their own existence, DP personnel flooded the manager with
so much data that he had not the time nor the patience to
sift through it all in search of the small amount of
relevent information . [Refs. 1,3] This led to managerial
frustration and disgust with MIS.
(3) Perhaps the most commonly accepted cause for this
"MIS potential-realization gap" [Ref. 2: p. 231 ] is that not
enough attention was paid to the proper content of the
information system during the development process. [Ref. 4]
In other words, the systems were simply not providing the
managers with the information they really needed. Taggart
and Tharp discuss a national survey conducted by researchers
at Colorado State University in 1975 which pointed out that
the identification of information needs of management can be
considered the most critical factor associated with
successful MIS implementation second only to the definition
of system objectives. [Ref. 2: p. 231 ] Dhar and Davis charge
that the information provided to managers was often
11

incorrect, inadequate, inconsistent, ambiguous, or
unavailable. [Ref. 5: p. 191] Dr. Gordon B. Davis of the
University of Minnesota and the Management Information
Systems Research Center, one of the foremost figures in the
field, agrees. "The analysis of information needs has
always been one of the most significant problems in
information systems design and implementation...." [Ref. 6:
p. 41 ] Numerous examples of MIS development and
implementation efforts which have failed due to an inability
to meet the users' needs are present in the literature.
[Ref s. 7,8 ]
What can be done about this pervasive problem? The
fields of Information Requirements Analysis (IRA) and, more
specifically, Information Requirements Determination (IRD)
have arisen to attempt to answer this question. (In
practice, these two terms are used interchangeably, and will
be used that way in this paper, also.) IRA seeks to
discover the nature of the information needs problem and to
develop techniques or methodologies for overcoming it.
Before delving too deeply into IRA, it would be useful
to clarify some of the terminology which will be encountered
during any discussion of this area of research.
Despite the fact that MIS's have been around for over
two decades, there is still no clear agreement on the answer
to the question "What is a Management Information System?"
Each author advances his own definition at the start of his
12

writing to clarify his use of the term, so I shall do the
same. In this paper, a Management Information System (MIS)
shall refer to any system designed to provide one or more
managers, at any level in the organization, with information
to support managerial decision making. Strictly speaking, an
MIS could be manual or computer-based, but in this paper the
latter flavor is assumed. Any business data processing
activity which is not an MIS is a TRANSACTION PROCESSING
SYSTEM which performs a clerical or recordkeeping task
rather than providing information. Payroll, accounts
receivable, sales order processing, and similar activities
are examples of Transaction Processing Systems. The reader
will undoubtedly notice that the MIS concept defined here
encompasses a huge area of data processing. For this
reason, it is helpful to categorize MIS, using Robert N.
Anthony's framework [Ref. 9], into information systems
supporting (1) Operational level decisions, such as those
encountered in a manufacturing environment where the manager
is concerned with control of the efficiency and
effectiveness with which a task is accomplished (I shall
refer to systems in this category as OPERATIONAL MIS); (2)
Management level decisions, somethimes referred to as
"tactical" planning or control, such as those made by
managers when allocating or monitoring the status and use of
organizational resources (I shall refer to systems in this
13

category as TACTICAL MIS); and (3) Strategic planning
decisions, which are generally made in connection with
organizational objectives as well as the resources used to
attain these objectives and the policies that are to govern
the acquisition, use, and disposition of these resources
[Ref. 9: p. 24] (this will be called STRATEGIC MIS). The
boundaries between these categories are fuzzy, but they are
nonetheless useful.
The decisions which managers must make at these three
levels can be either STRUCTURED or UNSTRUCTURED. Herbert A.
Simon first discussed this concept in 1960. [Ref. 10] Using
slightly different terminology, Simon describes structured
decisions as those that are repetitive and routine, to the
extent that a definite procedure has been worked out for
handling them so that they don't have to be treated de nova
each time they occur. Unstructured decisions, on the other
hand are those for which there is no cut-and-dried method of
handling the problem because it hasn't arisen before, or
because its precise nature and structure are elusive or
complex, or because it is so important that it deserves a
custom tailored treatment. Further, an unstructured
decision problem calls for a response where the system has
no specific procedure to deal with situations like the one
at hand, but must fall back on whatever general capacity it
has for intelligent, adaptive, problem-oriented action.
[Ref. 10: pp. 5-6 ] The distinction between structured and
14

unstructured decisions is necessary because the type of
information required for each is different and the proper
matching of information type with decision type is an
essential ingredient to the success of an MIS. [Ref. 11]
The emphasis of this paper is on the USER, but who in
fact are the users of an MIS? Quite simply, the users of a
management information system are those managers in the
organization to whom the outputs of the system are directed
for decision-making purposes. [Ref. 12: p.1 31 ] Since only
managers are considered users of an MIS, I shall often use
the terms "manager" and "user" interchangeably.
USER INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS refer to any and all
elements of information required or desired by the manager
in fulfilling his managerial tasks, expressed in terms of
the content, scope, quality, accuracy, and timeliness of the
information required. [Ref. 12: p. 132] I would hasten to
add "format" to this list. Some authors, notably Ackoff
[Ref. 1], point out that the manager does not really need
all the information he wants ; much of that requested by
managers is desired because they do not understand what
variables actually affect the outcome of the situation being
considered, so they want everything. But they do not know
precisely which information they really need and neither
does anyone else, so, until a satisfactory model of the
decision situation is developed, the manager does in effect
need everything he wants.
15

Equivalent terms used in place of User Information
Requirements are INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS, USER
REQUIREMENTS, USER NEEDS, and INFORMATION NEEDS.
In an attempt to keep this paper from trespassing into
the technical realm of systems analysis and software
engineering, it is necessary to distinguish between user
requirements and system spe cifications . Systems
specifications are the technical translation of information
requirements into required output and minimum standards of
performance for the software used to implement the MIS. The
difference is also one of perspective: User requirements
are written with the user in mind while system
specifications consider the programmer.
As mentioned previously, Information Requirements
Analysis is the field of research through which information
system specialists hope to gain an understanding of the
information requirements determination problem thereby
enabling the construction and successful implementation of
techniques for accurately eliciting the information needs of
managers. Although no techniques have been conclusively
proven effective, several have been developed and
successfully implemented under experimental conditions.
In light of the results of IRA research, this thesis has
the broad objective of investigating the degree to which the
extensive MIS literature involving information requirements
16

determination (IRD) has had practical impact on the way in
which MIS's are actually developed.
More specifically, the study will:
(1) present and discuss the IRD problem and techniques
borne of the IRA research which has been conducted up
to the present,
(2) identify the techniques and methods of IRD currently
being used by MIS professionals in industry, and
(3) attempt to draw some conclusions about the
relationship between IRA research and application.
To achieve these objectives, the paper will be divided
into two parts. Part I, to which this chapter belongs,
deals with the introduction to and description of the IRD
problem. Following that, some of the IRD techniques
proposed in the literature are presented. Part II discusses
the results of a fifteen-organization survey which attempted
to identify the practical application of these IRD
techniques and draws some conclusions. It must be pointed
out that due to time and resource constraints, the survey of
industry is not adequate for a valid statistical analysis
but rather, was intended to provide a learning experience
for the student and a "rough" indication of the state of the




II. THE INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROBLEM
It was mentioned in the last chapter that the main
reason many MIS's fail to perform as expected is that they
are not meeting the needs of their users. The intuitive
solution to this problem is to revise the system so it does
meet those needs. Unfortunately, this is not as easy as it
seems for two reasons. First, once the system is up and
running, it is very expensive, in terms of both money and
personnel effort, to change a system; second, many DP
managers either do not know or refuse to accept the fact
that the users are dissatisfied. The best way to deal with
the problem is to ensure that it is not permitted to exist
in the first place. The logical way to determine what
information a manager needs would seem to be to simply ask
him. But herein lies the heart of the IRD problem; one
cannot always ACCURATELY determine what information a
manager needs simply by asking him. This fact is one of the
few, if not only, issues upon which everyone in the field of
IRA agrees. The question now is, "Why is asking a user what
he needs insufficient?"
Davis proposes three basic reasons:
1 . the constraints on humans as information processors
and problem solvers;




3. the complex patterns of interaction among users and
analysts in defining requirements. [Ref. 13: p. 5]
I shall next explain each of these in reverse order.
A. COMPLEX PATTERNS OF INTERACTION
Specifically, several sub-problems fall into this
category. First, it often happens that the user "experts"
are (or think they are) too busy to get deeply involved in
the MIS development project so they assign less qualified
surrogate experts [Ref. 14: p. 4], who do not understand the
task or its requirements nearly as well as the principal
user, to work with the systems analyst. Worse yet, the user
may just completely refuse to make more than a token
contribution to the effort. This generally prevents him
from developing any sort of commitment to the project as
well as denying him an understanding of what the computer
can do for him.
Second, when the analyst interviews the manager to
collect information on the requirements of the system, the
manager may feel threatened. Often, managers consider the
criteria they use for making decisions to be privileged
information or "not for public consumption" and do not want
it documented for all to see. This may lead the manager to
make omissions or exaggerate, or to provide requirements
which are inaccurate, vague, or nonspecific. [Ref. 12] In
extreme cases, the user may intentionally give invalid
requirements in an effort to sabotage the system. [Ref. 15]
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Third, even though he is trying to be honest and
helpful, the user may provide the analyst with erroneous
information which represents opinion but not fact. Also, he
may omit crucial details or very rare but significant
exceptions. [Ref. 16: p. 15]
Fourth, managers may mistakenly assume that the analyst
understands more than he really does about the manager's
job. The analyst himself may think he understands the
manager's job when, in fact, he does not. [Ref. 16]
Fifth, users generally express their needs in natural
language (English) but natural language is not sufficiently
precise for stating requirements. [Ref. 14: p. 4] This
presents another problem when the systems people try to
translate those requirements into "computer language." In
doing this, they often use their own interpretation of the
requirements which is colored by their idea of the solution.
[Ref. 17] Further, when they check back with the users to
make sure they have obtained the correct requirements, the
users do not understand what they are reading, if they
bother to read the analysts' documentation at all.
Sixth, the systems "experts" too often get wrapped up
in the technical aspects of the MIS, for example, devices,
languages, record formats, etc., and lose sight of the
overall problem to be solved. [Ref. 14]
Finally, there are too many communication links
through which the users' requirements must pass, and at each
20

stop those requirements can be misunderstood, filtered, and
passed on incorrectly. To illustrate, the user expresses
his needs to the systems analyst who passes them to the
systems designer. From there, they continue on to the
program designer and finally to the programmers. [Ref. 14]
B. VARIETY AND COMPLEXITY OF INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
Again, we encounter numerous sub-problems. First,
managers are usually experts in performing their jobs but
not necessarily in describing them. In the "content-given"
world of transaction processing systems and information
systems supporting structured decisions, the task to be
performed is usually fairly well defined. Procedures,
methods, and models already exist; thus the requirements
tend to be black-and-white, relatively easily understood,
and relatively easily determined. But in the "content-
undetermined" world of tactical and strategic MIS which must
deal with unstructured decisions, the manager may be
incapable of articulating (or even knowing) requirements
with the specificity that designers require in the
application of traditional design methodologies. [Ref. 18:
p. 2] More likely, he has only vague, general ideas of what
it is he needs. After all, unstructured, high-level
decisions are such because there is no model or set process
for making the decision. So almost by definition the
manager will have difficulty explaining exactly what he
21

needs and, indeed, he may not even know what he needs. In
fact, in extreme cases, the manager may not even kno.w what
decisions he should be making or how to make them. [Ref. 19]
Second, managers often make unanticipated, emergent
decisions; hence, it is difficult to determine in advance
just what information will be needed. [Ref. 20]
Third, the procedures, rules, and regulations of an
organization can become internalized by a manager when he
has been working there for a sufficiently long period of
time. They eventually are thought of almost as "customs" of
the organization and are applied, without very much
consideration as to their applicability, in all situations.
This may be contributing to the problem which the MIS is
designed to solve, but when asked what he needs, the manager
unconsciously requests an information system which supports
those same procedures, rules, and regulations. Without some
level of objectivity, the user's analysis of his own problem
is likely to be distorted. This difficulty is more often
encountered when designing operational level or structured-
decision MIS.
Fourth, along somewhat the same vein, the way some
structured decisions are supposed to be made and the way
they are actually made is often different. When questioned
by a systems analyst, the user will generally describe the
way decisions are supposed to be made in an effort to
22

disguise the fact that procedures are not being followed.
The resulting MIS will then not properly support the user's
actual decision process. Further, bottlenecks and
distortion in the information flow which may exist in the
actual decision process are not identified and corrected.
[Ref. 15]
Finally, the systems people may also fail to understand
the problem due to its complexity despite an honest attempt
by the user to provide a straightforward description. [Ref.
14]
C. CONSTRAINTS ON HUMANS AS INFORMATION PROCESSORS
This is the most "scientific" of the three categories
and is supported by a good deal of psychological research
conducted over the last twenty to thirty years. Davis [Ref.
1 3 ] is one of the few IRA researchers to explore this aspect
of the IRD problem so all of the following sub-problems,
except the first, reflect his ideas.
The first item, proposed by Lederer, basically states
that preconceptions and prejudices on the part of the users
affect their ability to accurately describe their needs.
They may think the computer can do more than it really can
or may be bitter about some bad experience in the past.
"Science fiction-like stories cause them to attribute too
much intelligence to the computer and to underestimate the
importance of their careful explanations." [Ref. 16: p.15]
23

Davis' first explanation incorporates a theory
discussed by Newell and Simon. [Ref. 21] The human
information processor uses three memories — external, long-
term, and short-term. External memory is any object or
device upon which data is recorded or displayed, such as a
piece of paper, a chalkboard, or any sort of visual display
device. The human brain has a capability for both long- and
short-term memory. Long-term memory has essentially
unlimited capacity. It requires only a few hundred
milliseconds to read (recall) from it, but the write time
(commit to memory) is fairly long. [Ref. 13: p. 8 ] Anyone
who has studied for an examination or memorized a poem for a
high school English class should be familiar with long-term
memory. Short-term memory, on the other hand, is human
processor memory. It is very fast, but small in capacity.
Its limitations may affect human ability to define
requirements. [Ref. 13:. p. 8] To use a computer analogy,
short-term memory has been compared to a register or cache
memory.
Psychological researchers believe that the capacity of
short-term memory is "seven plus or minus two." [Ref. 22] In
other words, the brain can store from five to nine
individual characters, page numbers, words, or even visual
images. For example, a telephone number may completely fill
short-term memory while dialing. This affects the
24

determination of information requirements in the following
way:
The limits of short-term memory affect the information
requirements obtained whenever the process being used to
elicit requirements uses only short-term memory (such as
an interview unaided by external storage). The user being
interviewed cannot hold a large number of items in short-
term memory for discussion or analysis purposes and is
therefore limited in processing responses. The short-term
memory limitation may also affect the number of
requirements that users define as important. In various
processing activities using short-term memory, the user
may have selectively emphasized a few items of information
and recorded these in long-term memory as being the most
important. These few may be the only ones recalled when a
question is asked. [Ref. 13: p. 9 ]
There are two ways to offset these limitations. First, the
user can utilize external memory to document his needs as he
thinks of them before the interview and, second, by using
iterative IRD techniques that elicit small amounts of data
at a time and immediately record them.
Third, humans are biased in their selection and use of
data. There are four types of bias that affect the
information requirements determination process:
(1) Anchoring and adj ustment--j udgments and decisions
are often made by applying adjustments to an anchor point;
in other words, the decision-maker will start from a known
value, which is the information he is currently receiving,
and make modifications from that base to arrive at a new set
of requirements. This prevents new requirements, which are




(2) Concreteness--humans tend not to search for
information beyond that which they already have. They tend
to use what they have in the form it is presented rather
than transforming or manipulating it. Consequently, the
requirements defined tend to be based on information the
users already have about their requirements. They are
hesitant to delve deeper into examining what they need
beyond what they already know they need.
(3) Recency—humans are more influenced by events which
occurred recently than by those which occurred in the past.
Therefore, needs discovered through a past event will tend
to be overshadowed by needs discovered recently.
(4) Intuitive Statistical Analysis--I shall refer to
Davis' explanation:
Humans are not good as intuitive statisticians. For
example, humans do not intuitively understand the effect
of sample size on variance and therefore draw unwarranted
conclusions from small samples or a small number of
occurrences. This is an important limitation because many
organizational phenomena occur at a fairly low rate.
Also, there is a tendency to identify causality with joint
occurrence and assign cause where none exists. These
limits of humans in processing low-occurrence data and in
identifying causality may result in misjudging the need
for information. [Ref. 13: p.10]
To sum up the effect of human bias on the IRD process,
we can say that the user is likely to provide inaccurate
requirements which are based on "current procedures,
currently available information, recent events, and
inferences from small samples of events." [Ref. 13: p. 9]
26

Finally, the IRD process is complicated by human
problem solving behavior. Two useful concepts here are
"task environment" and "problem space." The task
environment represents the actual problem to be solved and
includes the interrelationships of all variables which
influence the environment. The problem space represents the
problem as viewed by the problem-solver for purposes of
working on a solution. The problem space is thus of a more
limited scope than the task environment. In the IRD
process, the task environment is the IRD problem itself.
The problem space is how a particular analyst or user
represents this problem for purposes of determining the
requirements for an MIS. Training, prejudice, custom,
attitude, and bounded rationality are what create the
limitations on the problem space. Of these, only bounded
rationality requires an explanation.
Problems are often too complex to be dealt with
directly, so the problem-solver must create a model or a
simplification of the problem. Rationality is thus bounded
by this model which may or may not correspond to the actual
problem. The accuracy of the solution, then, depends on how
well the model represents the actual problem. A poor model
or an oversimplification can lead to a problem space which
is so limited that the solution is invalid. This is what
often happens in IRD and it is an affliction that can affect
analysts and users alike.
27

In summary, all of these individual difficulties with
getting accurate and complete information requirements can
be grouped under the three main categories mentioned at the




The complex patterns of interactions among users and
analysts in defining requirements.
2. The variety and complexity of information
requirements.
3. The constraints on humans as information processors
and problem solvers.
All three of these must be overcome to permit the definition
of truly reliable information requirements. The next seven
chapters discuss some techniques or methodologies for





There are certain activities in the IRD process which
may be considered as "ground level" or basic; they are the
"primitives" of the IRD process. In other words, they
cannot be decomposed into sub-activities. These basic
activities may be used by themselves but more often are a
part of a larger, more comprehensive requirements definition
I
—
methodology. Interviewing, use of questionnaires, direct
observation, document examination, and measurement, all
perhaps more accurately described as data gathering
techniques, are the subject of this chapter. Additionally,
two approaches to applying these techniques, top-down and
bottom -up, are covered.
A. INTERVIEWING
This is the most common method for gathering data
relating to information needs. It is very effective for
obtaining opinions and insights concerning the effects
certain policies, programs, and systems have on other
acitvities, as well as obtaining evaluations of the
performance of existing information systems. Interviewing
is also useful in collecting data that cannot otherwise be
observed, for example the operation of the "informal
organization," and it will sometimes aid in the discovery of
2S

sources of resistance to the proposed system. That same
interview can then be used to dispel misconceptions and
apprehension, thereby dissolving that resistance. Perhaps
the main appeal of this data collection tool is that it is
one of the simplest and quickest ways to accomplish these
tasks. Even in cases where the weaknesses of interviewing
hamper its success, it reamins a good a starting point for
the systems analyst. ,
The effectiveness of an interview is hindered for
several reasons, many of which are reflected in the IRD
problem discussed in Chapter 2. But there are others.
First, success of any interview is heavily dependent on the
skill of the interviewer; i.e., how he handles himself, to
what extent he dominates the conversation, the types of
questions he asks, etc. "The interviewer's risk of being
'sandbagged' with erroneous and incomplete information is in
direct proportion to his dominance of the interview
situation." [Ref. 15: p. 27] , The environment must be
carefully planned beforehand to ensure it is conducive to
good dialog. One example of an ill-planned interview is one
which is conducted just prior to lunch or quitting time.
The interviewee is anxious to get out of the office and a
poor dialog is virtually assured.
Second, the interviewee's reponses will be heavily
biased by his goals, attitudes, beliefs, and motives. The
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interviewer must understand these factors so that he can
view the responses in the proper perspective.
Third, the interviewee may provide information which is
not totally accurate or complete. This may be due to his
inability to understand the process he is describing or the
question that was asked or to say what he really means; that
is, to articulate his needs in a way the analyst will
understand. If the respondent has some objection to the
proposed system, he may intentionally inject invalid
information in an attempt to have the project scrapped
before implementation or fail afterwards. Such "counter-
implementation" techniques can be very sophisticated and
very difficult for the analyst or project team to overcome.
[Ref . 23]
Fourth are the ever present communication problems
between two humans attempting to pass information.
Misunderstanding, misinterpretation, filtration, and related
difficulties take their toll. This and similar problems
were introduced in the previous chapter as "complex patterns
of interaction." Finally, interviewing is simply not
practical in situations where there is a great number of





The latter two situations mentioned as weaknesses of
interviewing are the forte of questionnaires. That is, they
are most useful for collecting data from a large number of
individuals or those who are geographically dispersed. A
key point in evaluating the utility of a questionnaire is
"How committed is the user to solving the problem we are
attempting to solve with the use of this questionnaire?" If
the users, who are assumed to be the respondents, have a
stake in the succussful completion of the project they are
more likely to provide more and better information via the
questionnaire. Even with user commitment, however, it is
difficult to collect small details and to get the respondent
to elaborate on certain items he has mentioned. Also,
without the personal contact to stimulate the user it is
likely that less well thought out answers will be received.
In the absence of user commitment, it is wise to contact
the proposed respondent ahead of time and attempt to obtain
from him some sort of consent to complete and return the
questionnaire. This places him under a pseudo-obligation,
in a sense, to cooperate. Even so, people generally object
to long questionnaires or those that require long or
involved answers; multiple choice or yes/no type questions
are the most successful. In any event, the project team can
expect long response times. Finally, it is often a good
idea to distribute a sample questionnaire to a relatively
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small group and then analyze the results. This enables an
evaluation of its effectiveness in eliciting the desired
responses. The questionnaire may then be modified, or
cancelled, before the actual study begins.
There is significant disenchantment with
questionnaires for determining information requirements for
many of the reasons cited, but their successful use has been
reported in the literature. [Refs. 24,25]
C. DIRECT OBSERVATION
As the name implies, direct observation involves
observing the process that the MIS is designed to support.
The analyst can see how documents are handled and how
policies and procedures are followed under different
conditions. Further, this allows him to discover
information gaps in the system as well as bottlenecks and
other information flow problems. It is the most effective
way to learn about the existing system, how successful it
is, and how it is affected by external activities or events.
There are two approaches that can be taken. First, the
analyst can be an outside observer . That is, he keeps his
distance from the activity and just watches. The strong
point about this technique is its objectivity. Second, the
analyst may choose to be a participant observer in which




This reveals to the analyst any subtle rivalries,
attitudes, or political impacts which may not be apparent to
an outsider.
There are three main disadvantages of direct
observation. First of all, the results may be biased by the
Hawthorne Effect which basically says that people will
behave differently than normal when they know they are being
observed. The second problem is that the process of
observing and drawing the correct conclusions is very
difficult. James A. Senn points out:
The ability to view a series of activities and
continually focus on the proper aspects of them without
distortion or distraction is a special skill. It is not
something that can be easily learned. [Ref. 26: p. 476]
Third, the technique works better for clerical tasks and
operational level structured decisions than for higher level
unstructured decisions. In the latter case, the cognitive
process of the decision maker is extremely difficult, if not
impossible to observe.
A technique based on direct observation is "task
analysis" [Ref. 16: p. 17], also called "functional
analysis," which is described more. fully in the next
chapter.
D. DOCUMENT EXAMINATION
The best way to obtain an overall picture of the
organization or functional area, according to Guerrieri
[Ref. 15: p.27], is through document review, or document
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examination. Using this method, the analyst looks at
reports, memoranda, letters, policy statements, standard
operating procedure manuals, and reports of previous
investigations and analyses. The object is to see what
information is currently being transmitted to whom or
requested by whom, how the organization operates, what types
of tasks are being done and how, etc. Additionally,
computer listings, ledgers, catalogs, and records used in a
process should be reviewed to see what information is
currently available and in what form.
The problem with this method is that an analyst cannot
always trust the documentation because organizations do not
always operate the way they say they do. Also, changes in
policies and procedures may not be reflected in the
organization's documentation for several months or even
years. Last, but most important, is that the information
reflected in the documents may be extraneous and not even
used in reality, while some very important information may
travel via informal routes, such as notes or verbal
exchanges between managers.
Document examination can still be a valuable tool; the
point is that it must be used in conjunction with one or
more other techniques. These other techniques can be used
to validate the requirements generated from the document




The value of this technique is more or less limited to
operational level MIS. Also called sampling , it is used to
approximate, within reasonable and workable limits, the
frequency with which certain events occur in normal work
activities. [Ref. 26: p. 477] The data thus gathered can be
used to identify and classify exceptions for use in
exception reporting, for example. Also, information on
certain activites may be needed only if those activities
take place with significant frequency.
F. TOP-DOWN VS. BOTTOM -UP APPROACH TO REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
Two of the most commonly heard buzzwords in systems
development are "top-down" and "bottom-up". These terms
relate to the progression through the managerial levels of
an organization followed by analysts in determining
information requirements.
Using the top-down approach, the higher levels of
management are consulted first, followed by progressively
lower-level managers until the entire targeted user
community has defined their needs. In contrast, the bottom
-
up approach involves obtaining the needs of the lowest level
managers first then progressing up to top management.
The theory behind the top-down approach is that the top
level managers have the "big picture"; they define their
needs in terms of the overall corporate strategy and
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objectives. The requirements of the lower level managers
should, ideally, all fall into place within the top
manager's framework, each forming a piece of the total "MIS
mosaic." [Ref. 27: p. 78] These lower level managerial needs
are a translation of top management's strategy and policies
into action-oriented terms. There are three significant
advantages with this approach.
(1) Top management is more keenly aware of what is and
what is not really important to the organization and can
pass this along to the analyst, enabling him to focus on the
really relevant information.
(2) This approach avoids the patchwork effect of lower
level requirements which may be unrelated to the overall
goals of the organization and which subsequently fail to
support progress toward achieving those goals.
(3) Often, if lower level management's efforts are
moving in a direction away from top management's objectives
or are failing to support them, the top-down approach will
detect this, enabling the situation to be investigated and
corrected before going any further. If the situation went
undetected, any MIS implemented in an organization with such
a problem will almost surely fail.
,
Proponents of the bottom-up approach point out that
using their method enables the analyst to already understand
the operations and needs of lower level managers before
entering into discussions with top management. The benefits
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of this are twofold. First, it provides an opportunity to
"sell" top management on the need for an MIS, and second, it
serves to bring top management up-to-date on current
business problems. However, Krauss points out that a key
weakness of starting out at the "ground level" is that
...the fragments of information gathered may not fit
into a mosaic of any kind and as a result may produce
misunderstandings and confusion. The absence of a central
or unifying theme, with at least some guideposts along the
way, may well get a negative reaction from top managers
when MIS discussion finally gets to them. [Ref. 27: p. 79]
The implication is that top-down is the preferred approach
although bottom -up may apply in certain situations.
G. SUMMARY
Sometimes the tools discussed in this chapter form an
IRD technique of their own, but more often they form the
foundation for the techniques presented in subsequent
chapters. Individual tools, or combinations of them, are
components of the more sophisticated methodologies. In
addition to being used to complement each other, one may be
used to validate requirements determined primarily by
another. The top-down and bottom-up concepts are relevant
because many of the techniques presented later may be
applied in a top-down or bottom -up fashion.
The remainder of Part I discusses some of the IRD
techniques that have appeared in the literature from 1 963 to
the present and organizes them into the following groups:
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Early Techniques (Chapter 4)
Information Analysis (Chapter 5)
Group Techniques (Chapter 6)
Other Approaches (Chapter 7)
Iterative Design Techniques (Chapter 8)
Selection Methods (Chapter 9)
User self-determination of needs (Chapter 10)
There is a considerable gray area and overlap between many
of these groups so the classification of individual
techniques was made subjectively; however, such a framework





Two techniques fall into this category: Ask and Analyze
(my own terminology), and Functional Analysis (sometimes
called Task Analysis). These are not described as "early"
because they were used only in the early days of MIS, but
because they were the first techniques to be used; they are
still in use today. In fact, as we shall see in Part II,
they are still the most commonly used techniques.
A. ASK AND ANALYZE
Due to the poor results historically obtained from
"asking" users what their needs are, there is little, if
any, research currently being conducted in this area and
there is very little mention of it at all in the recent
literature. I include it in this survey of techniques,
however, because it is still so widely used.
Heany [Ref. 28] writes of a requirements determination
process which primarily emphasizes the Ask and Analyze
technique. The "asking" phase consists of the operating
manager meeting with the system designer to explain what
is needed. [Ref. 28: p.50] The designer must then analyze
the requirements which resulted from the meeting to
determine what the true requirements are, since the needs as
described by the user cannot be accepted at face value.
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More specifically, he must analyze the wording of the
specification, its source, and the business situation out of
which it arose. [Ref. 28: p. 51 ] The goal is to discover
and weed out contradictions and nuances. Cliches, slang,
and shoptalk are notoriously poor ways of conveying
information and should also be removed along with
generalizations and overly technical language. Basically,
the requirements should be couched in very precise terms
understood by all involved.
The requirements thus generated must then be validated.
The method proposed to accomplish this is for the designer
to discuss the requirements with users in various levels of
the organization and elicit their comments. Since
perspectives change with the organizational level, an
agreement on the requirements thus obtained should assure
their validity.
This is a relatively quick and simple way of
determining information needs but suffers from most of the
problems discussed in Chapter Two. The validation process
may help somewhat but not enough to produce a truly accurate
set of requirements.
B. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
This is an extremely popular technique whereby the
requirements for information are seen to be related to the
functions or the objectives of the organization and, hence,
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are derived from them. Most implementations of this
technique call for decomposing the functions into individual
tasks or component activities which must be performed in
order to accomplish the function or meet the organizational
objectives. These tasks are then analyzed in terms of what
they entail, when and how often they are performed, and any
additional considerations believed relevant. Information
requirements are then derived from each of these activities.
An application of this technique was described by
Sisson during the development of an MIS for U.S. Naval
shipyards. [Ref. 29] In this case, the functions of the
shipyards were identified and decomposed into second and
then third level functional units. The third level
functional units were examined to determine the management
processes to be supported and criteria necessary for the
execution of those processes, and then the information
needed from a management information system to execute those
management processes was identified. [Ref. 29: p. 237]
Miller [Ref. 4] provides a more detailed description of
the technique. The procedure is composed of five steps:
1. identify key operations,
2. list input/output and suboperations,
3. identify managerial actions,
4. list effects of managerial actions, and
5. derive information requirements.
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The analysis is conducted as follows. First, the
analyst, perhaps in conjunction with the manager,, must
identify the key operations that the enterprise must
accomplish in order to continue to function. [Ref. 4: p.611]
Second, these operations should be further classified by
listing the input and output for each, as well as a
description of the "suboperations" that compose the major
operation.
Upon completion of these two steps, the analyst will
have assembled a conceptual model of what the firm, as a
whole, does. [Ref. 4: p. 61 3] The next step involves
building a similar model to describe the functions of
management. Miller describes this step:
We have an adequate statement of what the company
does, but we must now decide how management manipulates
the things that the company does in order to make it
successful or unsuccessful. The basic question can be
simply stated as "How are the operations managed?' [Ref.
4: p. 613]
The implementation of this step, then, involves
identifying the significant managerial actions taken to
influence each operation.
To round out the managerial conceptual model, the
effects of each of these managerial actions are listed and
associated with the action that caused their occurrence.
This relationship is called the "action/result model," and a
close examination of it reveals that specific information
requirements may be derived from each element.
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By way of example, let us assume the firm is a
wholesaling business. One of the operations that .can be
identified in step 1 is "Get Orders." One of the many
managerial actions which may be taken to influence this
operation is "Adjust frequency of salesmen's order
solicitation." Miller explains:
This automatically suggests the question, How often
do salesmen solicit orders?' The simplest answer to that
question is the total number of calls made by all salesmen
in a month. Of course, we might want a finer breakdown
—
number of calls made by each salesman, and number of calls
made on each customer.. ..we might want to turn it around
and look at it from the customers' point of view. Kow
many solicitations does the average customer receive in a
month? [Ref. 4: p.618]
We might then want to measure the result of this action.
Looking at the action/result model shows us that one of the
expected results is a change in "salesmen's travel time," so
that would define a requirement to track and report the time
each salesman, or an average salesman, spends traveling per
unit of time.
The strength of this technique is that it provides a
structured method of determining which information is most
likely to have a bearing on the operations of the
organization. It seems, however, that it would generate an
overwhelming number of requirements. Also, neither of the
two cases presented emphasized much user involvement or
user-analyst interaction, which raises the possibility that
many of the requirements identified will be considered
irrelevant by the user or, just as bad, some requirements
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which are relevant and necessary will fail to be uncovered.
Even with user participation, the systematic and logical
progression of the process may lull him into accepting the
outputs without taking the time to analyze them and decide
if they meet his needs or not.
In an attempt to avoid many of the irrelevant
requirements generated using functional analysis, Chapman et
al. [Ref. 30], proposed a variant. Their method involves
first identifying the demands placed on the system by both
external entities (e.g., government or a parent
organization) and internal entities (e.g., top management).
Users are then interviewed to obtain an initial set of
requirements which are "bounced" against the demands on the
system and the organization's objectives. Any requirement
which does not support the satisfaction of a demand or an
objective is discarded, even though an individual manager
may sincerely wish to receive that element of information.
Chapman and collegues report that:
...no requirement can be retained for any reason
except that it is necessary to meet the valid demands made
on the system.
The analyst must probe and question until he knows why
the information flowing from a given requirement is
needed, how it is used and where, whether used elsewhere
or filed, and if so, why, until he knows every use and
disposition of the information being generated by each
requirement. In order to do this he must learn the
content of specific jobs in depth and the purpose each is
intended to serve. [Ref. 30: p. 38]
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They further state, "Requirements are determined on the
basis of actual need rather than on desire without any
demonstrable reason." [Ref. 30: p. 38] Despite its good
intentions, I have serious doubts about the effectiveness of
such a technique. Their intent is laudable, but this puts
the analyst in a position of making the decision as to which
requirements justifications are satisfactory and which are
not, a decision which he is doubtfully qualified to make.
Further, management is likely to resist making such
extensive justifications to the analyst. The system thus
runs the risk of being unresponsive to management's needs.
For the interested reader, Langefors [Ref. 31 ], Krauss
[Ref. 27], Hartman, Matthes, and Proeme [Ref. 32], and
Levinton and Dunning [Ref. 33] also discuss techniques and




The term "information analysis" generally refers to the
techniques of "data analysis" and "decision analysis" but I
shall stretch it here to also include "protocol analysis,"
and "information environmental analysis."
A. DATA ANALYSIS
This method is sometimes called the "traditional" or
"bottom -up" approach to determining information requirements
(not to be confused with "bottom-up" as used in Chapter 3).
[Ref. 34] Working together closely, the analyst and manager
identify all sources of information currently being received
by the manager and drawn upon for decision making. This is
more than a simple document examinatiion; all sources of
information whether formal (e.g., reports) or informal
(e.g., personal notes or discussions between managers) are
analyzed. With the manager's assistance, the analyst
attempts to determine how the information is used and to
establish its relevancy, resulting in the elimination of
unnecessary information. Next, the analyst and manager
discuss needs which are currently unsatisfied in an attempt
to identify what new information is required.
The advantage of this method is that it starts from a
concrete, known base—currently received information. This
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accomodates the "anchor and adjust" tendency of users (as
mentioned in Chapter 2) when defining their information
requirements. But herein lies its weakness. This "anchor
and adjust" tendency inhibits the discovery of the true
information requirements. The data analysis technique also
fails to link those requirements to the decision process
actually used by the manager. Even so, this approach is
believed to work reasonably well with structured decisions.
[Ref . 35 ]
B. DECISION ANALYSIS
Sometimes refered to as the "top-down" approach (again,
not to be confused with the usage of that same term in
Chapter 3), decision analysis requires that the analyst and
the manager identify all the decisions which the latter
makes, or should make. Then each decision is analyzed in an
attempt to build a model of the process used to reach that
decision. The information used at each step along the way
is examined as is information which should or could be used
if it were available. The result of this activity is the
set of information required to make each decision. This
would then be implemented in the information system.
The strength of this approach is that it forces the
manager to think about how he makes his decisions and what
information he really uses. This in turn increases the
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likelihood that the needs which are defined will be accurate
and complete.
Opponents of the method claim that, for unstructured
decisions at least, the manager is unable to identify the
process he follows. Proponents respond that, while this is
true in many cases, the act of forcing the manager to
analyze what he does may serve to clarify some previously
poorly understood processes.
C. DATA VS. DECISION ANALYSIS
Munro and Davis conducted an experiment designed to
compare the two methods. [Ref. 34] Expectations prior to
research were that (1) both decision analysis and data
analysis would perform better on structured decisions than
on unstructured decisions; (2) both methods would perform
equally well on highly structured decisions; (3) neither
approach would provide accurate results when used with
highly unstructured decisions; and (4) with relatively
unstructured decisions, decision analysis would perform
better than data analysis.
The findings of the experiment were somewhat surprising.
Greatly simplified and summarized, the results indicated
that: (1 ) the overall performance of the two methods was not
significantly different, (2) both performed better on
unstructured decisions than on structured decisions; (3)
data analysis performed poorly on structured decisions
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relative to either decision analysis or data analysis on
unstructured decisions; and (4) the effectiveness of
decision analysis on unstructured decisions was only
slightly greater than that on structured decisions. The
indication, then, is that (1) decision analysis should be
used on structured decisions and that (2) either method
could be used on unstructured decisions with approximately
equal results.
Finally, the most interesting finding was that there
was little difference in practice between the two methods.
Munro and Davis explain:
The researchers observed, for the entire set of
decisions, that use of the two techniques seemed to result
in similar interviews. In fact, it often seemed impossible
to discuss information needs (data analysis) without
discussing decision procedures (decision analysis) and
vice-versa. It became evident that many of the steps in
the decision procedure were actually the acquisition and
analysis of particular items of information. The only
manner in which the techniques seemed to differ was in the
analytical stage following the interview. While data
analysis involved an analysis of the data, decision
analysis involved the modeling (flowcharting) of the
decision procedure.... [Ref. 34: p. 64]
Unfortunately, in the six years that have passed since these
findings were reported, no evidence of further research on
this topic has been found.
Other authors discussing data and/or decision analysis
include Zani [Ref. 36] (decision analysis), Penney [Ref. 37]
(decision analysis), King and Cleland [Ref. 38] (decision
analysis), Courtney [Ref. 25] (data and decision analysis),
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Little has been written on the use of protocol analysis
in MIS development, but it is nevertheless an interesting
technique. An analyst using protocol analysis will ask the
user to "think aloud" as he performs an actual or simulated
task. The analyst records what the user says and from this,
information requirements are derived. Alternatively, the
user may simply jot down his thoughts as he performs a task
without requiring the analyst to be present. As the reader
has undoubtedly noticed, this technique is quite similar to
decision analysis, and it shares many of the latter's
advantages. However, much of the benefit of the analysis of
the decision process by the user (in decision analysis) is
lost because the user-analyst interaction is omitted. A
disadvantage which it shares with decision analysis is that
it causes the analyst to focus on the usual; unfortunately,
unusual circumstances and exceptions result in substantial
problems for information systems analysts. [Ref. 16: p.17]
E. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS
A very interesting variant of the decision/data
analysis techniques is one used by Willoughby and Gardner
[Ref. 39] during the design of an energy related information
retrieval system. Referred to as "information environmental
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analysis," the method principally revolved around the
concept of an "information tour." The analysts believed
that any analysis of the type of information used, how it
was used, how often it was used and how it was stored and
retrieved was best conducted in the users' normal work
environment. The authors explain:
Factors such as the content and organization of file
cabinets and bookcases may seem incidental but were in
fact, important indicators of user perceived relationships
among information types and users' priorities for
accessing information. For these reasons, the
participants were asked to provide an 'information tour'
of their workspace and to describe day-to-day activities
which utilized and generated information. [Ref. 39: p. 51 6]
Four advantages of this process were identified. First, it
would provide more information than the users were likely to
think of in a straight interview process; second, it aided
in revealing the type of information that users would find
useful in the performance of their jobs; third, it gave the
analyst an idea of what the users were looking for in a
computerized system to support the task under study; and




This category includes all the methods which involve
some sort of group interaction as the primary focus of the
technique. Discussed in this chapter are Brainstorming, the
Nominal Group Technique, and the Delphi Method.
All of these methods share the common advantages and
disadvantages of group processes. The advantages include:
1. The knowledge and information of the total group is
greater than that of any one individual in the group.
2. The misinformation of one member may be cancelled by
the true information of another.
3. The number of factors that can be considered by a
group is much greater than that of any one member.
4. Groups are generally more willing to take risks.
Some of the disadvantages are:
1. If related but incorrect information is held by two
or more members, each one's misinformation may tend to
support and amplify that of the others.
2. There may be strong social pressure on a member who
disagrees, perhaps correctly, with the group opinion to
"fall in line." If that individual concedes, the group has
lost the benefit of his accurate information.
3. Individuals with dominant personalities and loud
voices tend to improperly influence the group's behavior.
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4. If the group members are improperly selected and are
not representative of the total target population, they may
share a common bias. This increases the chance of
occurrence of item 1 in this list.
5. The group's goal may become distorted during the
process of discussion to the point that members may seek to
reach agreement rather than the best solution.
6. The group discussion, if not properly moderated, may
drift onto irrelevant issues or rehash past issues which
were already settled.
A. BRAINSTORMING
In its raw form, brainstorming involves a group of
people who meet to solve a problem. They contribute any
idea for a possible solution that comes to mind. Initially,
no criticism is permitted. The principle involved is that
the more people participating, the more likely they are to
provide a wide range of possible solutions. The criticism
is prohibited to avoid inhibiting the members' creativity.
It is hoped that, as more ideas are generated, the number of
good ideas will increase. A synergistic effect is also
assumed. Implementations of this technique generally include
some sort of discussion or evaluation of the ideas as a
second phase. The result of the process is a set of
requirements for the system. Although slight variations of
this technique are used fairly often in industry, very
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little has appeared in the literature. [Ref. 16] The reader
should bear in mind that, despite the benefits of group
interaction, brainstorming (as with all of the group
techniques) is essentially just a more involved way of
"asking" the manager what he needs, with all its associated
pitfalls.
B. DELPHI METHOD
The Delphi method has often been proposed as a method
of determining information requirements when the users are
geographically dispersed yet group interaction is desired.
The "standard" Delphi technique consists of
distributing a questionnaire to "experts" to elicit their
views or opinions of solutions to a particular task or
problem. The participants have no contact with one another
and each may not even know who the other participants in the
study are. When the administrator receives the responses,
he summarizes and distributes them to the participants along
with a follow-up questionnaire. In this way, the
respondents can see how their initial response compared with
those of others, who remain anonymous throughout the
process. This revised questionnaire explains to each
participant that several other experts in the field were
also surveyed and that the summary reflects their answers.
The participants must then reevaluate their initial
responses in light of the responses of the other experts in
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completing the revised questionnaire. Often, respondents
are also requested to state their reason for answering the
way they did. The process is then repeated. Over the
course of several iterations, the responses will tend to
converge, the number of iterations performed depending upon
the degree of convergence considered satisfactory by the
administrator
.
The advantages of Delphi are that, since the responses
of other "group" members are fed back to each participant,
most of the benefits of group interaction are realized while
at the same time most of the problems associated with groups
are reduced or eliminated. For example, dominance by one
individual with a strong personality or loud voice, strong
social pressure on dissenters to abandon a contrary view,
the protracted discussion of irrelevant and redundant
information, and the tendency of groups to work for
agreement rather than the best solution to the problem is
reduced or eliminated.
Sackman [Ref. 40] was quite vocal about Delphi's
weaknesses. Some that he listed include:
...considerable evidence that results based on the
opinions of laymen and "experts" are indistinguishable in
many cases; aggregate raw opinion presented as systematic
prediction; technical shortcomings, such as untested and
uncontrolled halo effects in the application of Delphi
questionnaires; unsystematic and nonreplicable definition
and use of "experts"; manipulated group suggestion rather
than real consensus; ambiguity in results stemming from
vague questions; acceptance of snap judgements on complex
issues; and the virtual absence of a vigorous critical
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methodological literature even though hundreds of Delphi
studies have been published. [Ref. 40: p.v]
The difficulties experienced in connection with the - use of
"experts" are often not as crucial when using the technique
for IRD purposes because the developers normally know who
the users of the proposed system will be, although this is
certainly not so in all cases.
Another problem with the technique is that it suffers
from many of the same weaknesses that afflict any use of
questionnaires (see Chapter 3).
When applied to determining information requirements,
the first round usually involves the actual elicitation of
needs and the users rank these needs in order of their
importance in the subsequent rounds. Jones [Ref. 41 ] used
Delphi to determine the requirements for a computerized
military command and control system and used an unstructured
questionnaire to initially obtain the requirements. Remus,
Sprague, and Gilbert [Ref. 42] established the needs of the
managers of the College Administration of the University of
Hawaii using a slightly modified Delphi technique. They
obtained the initial requirements through a brainstorming
session. In the report of their study, Remus et al.
hypothesized several benefits to be realized from the use of
Delphi in determining information requirements:
1. Because they are exposed to the responses of other
users who may be in different positions throughout the
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organization, the participants are influenced to take a more
organizational view of the information needs.
2. The process results in a prioritized list of needs,
which provides guidance to the system developer in deciding
which needs to include when constrained by resource
limitations.
3. Involvement of the information users is enhanced by
each participant's awareness of the needs of others.
4. The convergence of opinion obtained by Delphi serves
to enhance agreement on critical information systems needs
and identify those expressed needs which are significantly
non-standard. [Ref. 42: p. 543]
Though not addressed in any of the reports, intuition
hints that Delphi would not really solve many of the
difficulties involved with IRD. For instance, a simple
ranking of proposed requirements, themselves obtained using
a rather shaky technique, and then not validated, would
probably not reveal missing, inaccurate, vague, incomplete,
or exaggerated needs. There are at least two reasons for
this:
1. The initial statement of requirements was not
formulated using any particularly analytical or thought-
provoking technique.
2. There is no opportunity for discussion and evalua-
tion of each requirement; one invalid requirement may merely
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be ranked relative to another invalid requirement which
produces, not surprisingly, an invalid result.
Lederer agrees that the method is suited primarily to
higher level rather than detailed tasks. [Ref. 16: p.19] A
more useful application of Delphi in the systems development
process is illustrated by Willoughby and Gardner [Ref. 39]
who relied on a Delphi survey to determine who would be the
"outside users" of an energy related information system.
C. NOMINAL GROUP TECHNIQUE
Although not effective for determining minute details,
the Nominal Group Technique may be useful in uncovering more
general information requirements. [Ref. 16] This method was
developed by Delbecq, Van de Ven, and Gustafson [Ref. 43]
and is performed in two phases.
In Phase I, the participants are given a problem or
task to solve. Each individual writes down as many
solutions as he/she can think of within a given time limit.
It is important that no group interaction be allowed at this
point so that members have a chance to respond before being
influenced by the group. In Henderson and West's
implementation of the technique, some of the problems used
were "list those decisions you make in order to fulfill your
responsibilities" and "list those things you need to know
(information) in order to support this set of critical
decisions." [Ref. 44: p. 47] Next, the group coordinator
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polls each participant in round robin fashion and has them
provide one item from their list. This polling continues
until all the participants have exhausted their list. No
criticism of solutions is allowed at this point. There are
three benefits gained by using a round robin procedure: (1)
it eliminates dominance of the group by any one person, (2)
no individual can "hide" behind the group and avoid
participation, and (3) one member's idea may stimulate other
members to produce related ideas, a process called
"hitchhiking" by Delbecq et al.
Once all the ideas have been recorded and displayed by
the group coordinator, a period of clarification begins. It
is important that no evaluations or criticisms be allowed
during this step— only clarifications to ensure that all
participants understand the meaning of each solution. In
the course of clarification, some items may be combined,
deleted or restored.
In Phase II, the group votes on the solutions, thus
validating the results and ranking them by priority. The
results of the vote are fed back to the group where they are
discussed, sometimes ending in another vote. Hopefully, at
this point a group consensus will have been reached.
Henderson and West used a slightly modified version of
the Nominal Group Technique in obtaining information
requirements for a medium size manufacturing firm and
reported favorable results. [Ref. 44]
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In a sense, this approach is a combination of the
brainstorming and Delphi methods. From brainstorming it
borrows the face-to-face discussion which allows evaluation
of the validity of proposed solutions or information needs,
and from Delphi the repetitive voting or ranking process





This grouping has been termed "other" because it is
composed of several techniques which are unique and do not
really align themselves well with any of the other
categories. This chapter will discuss the Critical Success
Factors approach, Simulation, DEFINEPAC, the Critical
Incident Technique, and the Data Base approach.
A. CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS APPROACH
This method was developed by John F. Rockart of MIT in
an attempt to eliminate the overload of irrelevant
information with which managers have had to suffer since the
advent of MIS and as a means of focusing the content of the
information system on the really important aspects of the
organization. [Ref. 45]
Rockart describes "critical success factors" (CSFs) as
"the limited number of areas in which results, if they are
satisfactory, will ensure successful competitive performance
for the organization." [Ref. 45: p. 85] In other words,
satisfactory performance in the CSF areas is a prerequisite
to overall success of the organization and achievement of
the organization's goals. Failure to achieve adequate
results in these areas almost certainly leads to a
disappointing level of performance for the organization.

The first step in analyzing a manager's information
needs using the CSF approach is for the manager to define
his goals. Next, with the aid of the analyst, he determines
the critical success factors that influence attainment of
those goals. Then, ways of measuring performance in the CSF
areas are discussed, and the reports and data needed to
monitor this performance is defined. Some of this
information may already be available; that which is not is a
candidate for inclusion in a new information system. Once
developed, this system is modified as necessary to reflect
changes in CSFs (the changing business environment will
cause a manager's view of which factors are critical to
change) and even changes in the management personnel the
system was designed to serve.
The major appeal of this method is that it supplies only
the information that the manager feels is truly essential to
the continuing success of his organization and eliminates
the rest. Mintzberg points out that brevity, fragmentation,
and verbal communication characterize a manager's work [Ref.
46], implying that managers simply do not have the time to
dig through voluminous reports to find the few really
important elements of information. Therefore, it is
important to cut down the amount of information supplied by




Other advantages of the CSF approach include:
1. It provides better control by enabling the manager
to concentrate his attention on the areas most important to
him.
2. The process of analyzing and defining CSFs and the
measures for monitoring performance in these areas is
helpful to the manager in that it guides him in determining
the level of effort to invest in the different aspects of
the organization.
3. The information system is designed to be flexible,
i.e., changes in CSFs and changes in managers are considered
when the system is developed and, hence, may be incorporated
relatively easily.
The primary weakness of the method is that it entails
interviewing the manager and "asking" him what his CSFs are.
Davis commented that, "The possibilites of failure with the
method center on the ability of executives to respond with
critical success factors that are correct, complete, and
sufficient." [Ref. 47: p. 57] The same difficulties
discussed in Chapter 2 are applicable here, most notably the
limited capacity of humans for information storage, bias in
selection and use of data, and bounded rationality.
Despite these disadvantages, Rockart reported
substantial success with his method in experimental usage.
Munro and Wheeler applied the technique in a study involving
the information requirements of management in a large
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natural resources company [Ref. 48] and also reported
success. They attempted to overcome the weaknesses of the
method by using the corporate planning process to aid in the
identification of CSFs. Their study emphasized that by
examining the corporate plan, or strategy statement, the
objectives of managers within the corporation could be more
accurately determined, since the two are (or should be)
related. Once objectives are identified, the manager and
analyst determine the critical success factors that
influence the successful achievement of the objectives.
From here, specific performance measures and standards are
identified, followed by data required to measure
performance, and finally decisions and information required
to implement the plan.
The strength of Munro and Wheeler's approach is that the
CSF interviews are structured by the presence of goals and
objectives and this, they claim, helps nullify the effect of
human information processing constraints.
B. SIMULATION
In determining information requirements, simulation
comes in three flavors: Paper Simulation, Human Simulation,
and System Simulation (an original term of this author).
1 . Paper Simulation
This entails, in its simplest form, drawing a sample
output report on paper and presenting it to the user for
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comment/modification. Sometimes a CRT screen is used in
place of paper. This is an extremely popular and
inexpensive technique for verifying the format of a report
when developing an MIS [Ref. 16]. More elaborate paper
simulation schemes may be used, especially when the system
being developed is an interactive one. [Ref. 49]
2. Human Simulation
A more complex form of simulation is Human
Simulation. Van Cott and Kinkade [Ref. 50] studied the
feasibility of this technique for determining the
information needs of biologists. In their study, the
researchers established an information clearinghouse that
the biologists could call anytime they needed information.
This clearinghouse was staffed by a Request Receiver who
took the initial request from the biologists; a Request
Processor who listened to the tape recorded request,
interpreted and summarized it; a Search Strategist who
decided which sources would be used to fill the request; an
Information Searcher who obtained the requested information;
and a Messenger who delivered the information to the
requesting scientist. Response time ranged from one to
thirty-eight days, with the average being seventeen days in
the first study and seven days in each of the two follow-on
studies. Over a six-week period, requests made of the
clearinghouse were studied in an attempt to learn what
information the scientists were demanding, what type of
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interaction existed between the requestor and receiver, and
the requesting behavior of the scientists. Two follow-on
studies were done of six weeks and five weeks duration,
respectively, varying the number of scientists participating
and some of the characteristics of the clearinghouse. The
result of the studies was that use of such a technique in
the situation studied was found to be practical.
The advantage of this technique is that the
requirements determination method itself does not intrude
on the behavior of the scientist, causing it to change, or
confuse what a scientist says he needs with what he
actually uses. [Ref. 50: p.211]
Unfortunately, this approach is very expensive in
both time and personnel required and would seem to have
limited applicability in the business world due to the
immediacy required of the responses.
3. System Simulation
One of the weaknesses of the decision analysis
approach was described earlier as the inablility of the user
to articulate his decision process because he did not
understand it himself. System Simulation (a term I have
coined myself to describe a method studied by Werner,
Greenburg, and Goldberg [Ref. 51 ] for determining the
information needs of an outpatient clinic) tries to make up
for this difficulty. Rather than attempting to analyze the
user's decision process, it is much easier and more
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effective to design an environment in which behavior can be
observed to determine what information is being used and how
it is being used. Werner et al. point out that, "The
behavior of the physician does not necessarily reveal his
information processing model, but it does reveal the
information he uses." [Ref. 51: p. 43]
The method requires the creation of a large data
base with the capability of returning any single item of
information. This data base would need to contain all the
information likely to be needed by the user. A software
monitor is also necessary to record the items requested, the
information extracted, and the order of extraction. This
monitor is transparent to the user, so he has no idea that
his behavior is being observed. An analysis of the data
collected by the monitor should provide the analyst with a
list of all the information important to the user.
The advantages of this method are that it should
produce an accurate and complete list of user needs; since
there is no communication between user and analyst, there is
little possibility of ambiguity, misinterpretation,
exaggeration, etc. Also, as in human simulation, the user's
behavior is not changed by the intrusion of the IRD method
itself.
Unfortunately, this approach requires the use of a
fairly large amount of computer resources, and for this
reason may be impractical. Also, should some information
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needed by the user be inadvertently omitted from the data
base, the results will be invalid. Lastly, exceptional or
unusual cases which fail to occur during the period of
observation will cause important but infrequently used
information to be excluded from the information system.
C. DEFINEPAC
We have already discussed the fact that simply "asking"
a manager what he needs is not likely to produce an accurate
and complete set of requirements. Yet, few systems analysts
have the expertise to "tell" the manager what he needs.
Kennedy and Mahapatra [Ref. 52] surveyed the literature base
of existing techniques but found none they considered
adequate to do the job when dealing with unstructured
decisions. They concluded that the method most likely to
succeed in determining information requirements would be one
which provided some sort of structure to a normally
unstructured problem. They explained:
...it is assumed here that effective inquiry requires
a structured set of cues to trigger memory and to focus
managerial attention. Unstructured inquiry may elicit
good suggestions, but these will be so far from exhaustive
that the resulting MIS will be of marginal value. The
dilemma to be resolved, then, is to model the
"unmodelable." [Ref. 52: p.74]
The model they have derived is called DEFINEPAC and is
illustrated in Figure 7-1 . The heart of this model is the





















Figure 7-1 : DEFINEPAC Framework for Decision Modeling
Source: [Ref. 52: p. 75]
Decisions, then, should be concerned only with the flows
indicated in Figure 7-1. The object is not to define the
precise interrelationships between each of the variables of
the model— such a task would be far too complex and would
render the models useless—but, rather, to simply identify
which input variables are (somehow) relevant to
decisions about output variables. [Ref. 52: p. 74]
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After analyzing the decision process using this
framework, the analyst will have a list of information
elements, but with no clue as to how they fit into the
system or how important they are. The DEFINEPAC process
proposes that the analyst need not worry about how they fit
(interrelate), only about how important they are so that the
choice of which information elements to include in the
system can be made in light of existing information system
constraints (e.g., cost, computer resource limitations,
etc.). What is needed, then, is a relative ranking of the
information elements. Kennedy and Mahapatra believe that
the best person to perform this ranking is the manager
himself. The results of this task will not suffer from the
same problems afflicting the process of "asking" a manager
what his needs are because:
...wherever it is appropriate to entrust decision
responsibility for ill-structured problems to the
intuitive skill of managers, we believe it is a fortiori
appropriate to trust the judgement of these same
individuals in evaluating their actual and potential
supplies of information. [Ref. 52: p. 76]
The two researchers go on to describe a mathematical model
for accomplishing the ranking which considers the importance
of the information element to the decision being considered,
the importance of the decision to the department or
organizational subunit and the importance of the department
to the overall system.
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So, without needing to understand how information
elements are used (which is the most difficult phase of
analyzing an unstructured decision situation), the analyst
has determined which information to include in the MIS.
Granted, without bothering to study the interrelationships
of the information elements a lot of irrelevant information
will be identified for inclusion in the system, but if that
information is truly irrelevant, it will fall out that way
in the ranking and will end up at the bottom of the list.
The weakness of this method is that it is not a simple
task to quantify the importance of certain elements to a
larger system as the authors would have us believe. Also,
it is difficult to factor in unquantifiable considerations
or to indicate conditional importance (e.g., element X is
important to decision Y only if condition Z exists).
Despite the early success with this approach claimed by
its developers, no further references to it have been found
in the eight years since the cited article was published.
D. CRITICAL INCIDENT TECHNIQUE
This is a good technique for using in conjunction with
other IRD methods, but is insufficient to stand alone. It
basically entails soliciting from the user events that
occurred which had extremely favorable and extremely
unfavorable outcomes. It then identifies the user
activities which contributed to these incidents. Analysis
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of the activities should reveal very important information
which should be included in the system and information whose
absence could have undesirable affects.
Although this method has been suggested for use in
determining information needs, Lederer [Ref. 16] comments
that there is no known documentation of the application of
the technique to automated information systems.
E. DATA BASE APPROACH
This is actually a "non-technique" for determining
management's information needs; no requirements analysis is
done. Instead, every piece of data being collected anywhere
in the organization is thrown into the MIS data base. The
manager can then use whatever he wants and the Information
Services department is always prepared for any situation
that might arise. Head refers to this as the "Kitchen Sink"
approach [Ref. 53: p. 51 ]. Krauss points out that:
Much of the data -base approach is justified on the
grounds that being prepared for nearly any situation has
benefits that exceed the overhead or waste inherent in the
excessive storage and other handling it necessitates.
[Ref. 27: p. 75 ]
Nevertheless, this is an inefficient way of providing infor-
mation to management, except possibly in the case of an
interactive Decision Support System. Even there, however,
the cost may be prohibitive, despite the fact that Data Base
Management Systems and sophisticated query languages such as
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VIII. ITERATIVE DESIGN TECHNIQUES
All of the techniques discussed so far have weaknesses;
none of them are perfect. The unfruitful search for the
"ideal" IRD method has led many IRA researchers to conclude
that there may be no such thing. Parker observed in 1 970
that:
It is not possible by questionnaire and interview
techniques to determine how users will, in fact, react to
a system they have not seen or experienced at the time the
questions are being asked. [Ref. 24: p. 283]
As has been previously discussed, managers find it extremely
difficult to articulate, or even know, what information they
need to do their jobs. This is complicated by the fact that
they often do not understand the capabilities and
limitations of the information system available to them so
they do not even know what scale to use in defining what
they need. Users must first have a foundation, a reference
point, around which to assemble their information needs.
McKeever and Kruse have pointed out that managers tend to
be better at reacting than inventing. [Ref. 54: p.19]
Similarly, McCracken has suggested that "the plaintive
cry of the user is 'I can't tell you what I want, but I'd
recognize it if you showed me one! 1 " [Ref. 55: p. 447]
Another reason that traditional methods of requirements
determination have been perceived as unsuccessful is that
75

they do not allow for changes in the users' requirements
during the course of the system development. But such
change is inevitable. McCracken and Jackson draw an analogy
with the "Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle," namely:
...any system development activity inevitably changes the
environment out of which the need for the system arouse.
System development methodology must take into account that
the user, and his or her needs and environment, change
during the process. [Ref. 56: p. 31 ]
For these reasons, the concept of iterative design was
developed. Iterative design involves developing a "rough"
system for users to evaluate, and then modifying that system
in accordance with the users' wishes. This "evaluate and
modify" process is iterated until the system satisfies the
users. This system provides the users with a reference
point from which they can move toward the appropriate
solution. Recalling Davis' explanation of "anchoring and
adjustment" in Chapter 2, the iterative design process is
consistent with human nature.
There are essentially two approaches to iterative
design: Prototyping and Heuristic Development. Each of
these will be briefly described.
A. PROTOTYPING
There are four steps involved in prototyping. First,
the user's basic information requirements must be
identified. It is important to understand that the analyst
is concerned only with the essential features of the user's
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information requirements, as opposed to a highly detailed
analysis of specific needs. The requirements definition
need not be complete, and should not involve much time or
expense. Second, using these preliminary requirements, a
system (called a "prototype" [Ref. 57] or a "breadboard"
[Ref. 58]) is quickly developed, with an emphasis on
changeability , and provided to the user. Definitions of
"quickly" have ranged from "overnight" [Ref. 59] to "weeks"
[Ref. 60]. Almost no consideration is given to processing
efficiency of this system; in fact, it need not even be
programmed in the language in which it will ultimately run.
The goal in this step is not to produce a perfect system,
but just to produce a system, period. In the third step,
this prototype is given to the manager for him to use and
evaluate. Finally, the system developer, using the
manager's comments, revises and enhances the prototype,
correcting undesirable or missing features identified by the
user. It is important, again, that this modification be
made quickly and the prototype returned to the user for
another iteration of the process.
B. HEURISTIC DEVELOPMENT
Very similar to prototyping, Heuristic Development
involves using an iterative design technique for building
only the output system of the MIS. Wetherbe describes the
process. [Ref. 61] Data currently being used to support
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management is collected and loaded into a data base. Next,
screen formats and reports are developed to provide the
information required by the users. This "output system" is
given to the users for them to operate and evaluate. Just
as in prototyping, the output system is refined until it
meets the user's needs. At this point, a system to do the
input and processing is developed using a traditional
structured design approach.
C. EVALUATION OF ITERATIVE DESIGN
Iterative design has great promise for several reasons.
First, it gets a working system into the user's hands much
faster than traditional techniques. This is important in
keeping the user happy and keeping him interested. Second,
and somewhat related, is that this initial system, when used
by the manager, stimulates further identification of
requirements. Wetherbe explains:
The experience gained by the user interaction with the
system's technologies and capabilities functions as a
catalyst that allows users to more fully envision and
articulate their information requirements. [Ref. 61:
p.SR/14]
Third, a user evaluation of the system will take place
regardless of the development approach used. With any
system, users will identify features that they need added,
deleted, or changed. Iterative design approaches exploit
this tendency by integrating such evaluation and subsequent
modification into the technique. This way, the revisions
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can be made earlier in the development process and hence,
more cheaply. Also, changes can be made much more easily
and cheaply to the prototype than to a fully developed and
implemented system because the prototype is designed from
the beginning to be changed. Fourth, overall lifecycle cost
of the system will probably be lower due to a significant
reduction in maintenance costs, which are a major expense in
conventionally designed systems. Such reduced costs are
possible because most of the maintenance takes place at a
higher level (i.e., in the prototype) and because once the
production system is implemented, there should be less
maintenance required.
A fifth advantage is that the inevitable changing
requirements of the user can be accomodated more quickly and
cheaply. The reader is no doubt familiar with horror
stories of changing requirements causing systems development
time to double, and cost to triple. Sixth, overall
development time may be less, although this point is often
debated. This is because not all prototypes are "throw-
aways." That is, in some cases the prototype system evolves
until it meets the user's needs and at that time it simply
becomes the production system. Similarly, traditionally
developed systems go through a "use and modify" cycle as
well; hence, it becomes difficult to precisely define when
either of these systems are "complete" since modifications
may be made periodically throughout the lifecycle. Finally,
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iterative design methodologies force the users to become
actively involved in the project, which is a prerequisite
for success. A large percentage of the successful meeting
of needs is the responsibility of the users, and they play a
significant role in setting the pace of the development
effort.
Arguments against iterative design techniques have
centered around the fact that the development cost is
greater. In the short run, this is true. Expensive
computer resources are consumed in running and modifying the
system. Since most prototype systems were not written for
efficient processing, perhaps more resources than would
otherwise be necessary are utilized. The strength of
iterative methodologies lies in their long run lifecycle
savings. Unfortunately, many managers are forced by the
organizational environment to focus their energies on short-
term efficiencies; hence, iterative design is rejected.
Moreover, in systems where the task to be supported is well-
defined and structured and user requirements are well
understood, iterative design may, in fact, be more expensive
even over the lifecycle.
In summary, iterative design, and especially
prototyping, is the wave of the future. It is perhaps the
most widely published IRD technique ever. As will be seen
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in Part II, it has been relatively slow to catch on,





Which IRD technique is best? As with any management-
related topic, the answer is, "It depends." Just as we have
Situational and Contingency theories of management, we have
Situational and Contingency Theories of Information
Requirements Analysis. These theories basically hold that
the best IRD method to be used in any particular case varies
depending on the circumstances.
A. SITUATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Taggart and Tharp have developed what they refer to as
the "Situational Perspective on Information Requirements
Analysis" (SPIRA). [Ref. 2] The authors first identified
ten "aspects" of IRA techniques. See Appendix A for a brief
description of each. They then reviewed much of the IRA
(or, as they call it, "MIRA", Management Information
Requirements Analysis) literature and rated each technique
on the basis of how thoroughly the ten aspects were treated;
a grade of 1 indicated that the technique gave no
consideration to that aspect; 2, recognition of the
aspect; and 3, significant treatment of concepts covered
in the aspect. A sample of seven techniques rated by
Taggart and Tharp and the grades assigned for each aspect
is presented in Figure 9-1.
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When a new system is being developed, the three phases
of SPIRA are implemented. The first phase is Erofile
Development. The analyst completes an "analyst profile"
questionnaire which contains one question or statement
concerning the analyst's personal awareness and skills
relating to each of the ten aspects. Each question has
three possible responses, corresponding to a grade of 1,2,
ASPECTS from Appendix A
TECHNIQUE 1234_56^18!10
Chapman, et al. [Ref . 31
]
Hartman, et al. [Ref. 33]
Heany [Ref. 29]
Langefors [Ref. 32]
McKeever, et al. [Ref. 55]
Miller [Ref. 4]
Norton [Ref. 3]
ANALYST PROFILE 3 3 12 2 3 3 112
SITUATION PROFILE 3 12 2 3 2 3 12 1
2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 3 1
3 1 2 3 2 3 1 3 3 2
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2
2 2 3 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
2 1 3 3 3 1 3 1 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 3 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 3
Figure 9-1 : MIRA Technique Ratings, including sample Profile
ratings.
Source: Adapted from [Ref. 2]
or 3 respectively, similar to the MIRA technique grades
described earlier. A second questionnaire, the "situation
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profile," is similar to the analyst profile except that the
questions or statements relate to the analysis situation
rather than to the analyst. The situation profile is
completed by the analyst after throughly discussing each
item with the users. Sample results of an analyst and
situation profile are shown at the bottom of Figure 9-1.
The second phase, Composite Evaluation, attempts to
match technique capabilites to the conditions of the
situation and the skills of the analyst. The reader may
follow this process graphically as it is explained by
referring to Figure 9-2.
TECHNIQUE
ASPECTS from Appendix A
© O © © © © <2>






























Figure 9-2: Steps in the selection of a MIRA technique.
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1. Examining the results of the situation profile, any
aspect having a grade of 1 is unimportant to the analysis
situation, so corresponding aspect columns may be eliminated
(lines 1,2, and 3 in Figure 9-2).
2. Examining the results of the analyst profile, any
aspect graded as 3 is no longer of concern because the
analyst is well skilled in these areas and need not rely on
the MIRA technique for support in those aspects. Hence, we
may eliminate the corresponding aspect columns (lines 4,5,
and 6).
3. Any aspect graded as 2 in both the analyst and
situation profile is not critical because the analyst is
presumed to have enough skill to cover the moderate
requirement of the situation in that aspect, so the
corresponding aspect column is eliminated (line 7).
4. Now examine the technique ratings. Any technique
graded as 1 in any of the remaining aspects provides
inadequate support to the analyst and, hence, may be
eliminated (lines 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12).
5. Looking at the techniques still under consideration,
eliminate any having a grade of 2 in aspects where the
analyst grade is 1 and the situation grade is 3 (none in
this case).
6. Of the remaining techniques, all aspects still under




The final phase is Technique Selection. Since all of
the remaining techniques are presumed to adequately support
the analyst in the critical areas in which he is weak, the
final selection should be made based on analyst preference,
analyst and technique style compatability, cost of acquiring
new technology, etc. Naturally, the analyst must have a
reference describing each of the techniques; the authors
have provided just such a document. [Ref. 62]
The advantage of this method is discussed by its
developers:
Through the use of SPIRA, the analyst can combine
personal skills with a MIRA technique to achieve an
integrated set of conceptual skills closely matching the
organizational situation. SPIRA attempts to complement
existing skills and knowledge and to compensate for those
which are missing. [Ref. 2: p. 235]
There are three problems with the method, however. First,
the base of rated MIRA techniques must be continually
updated as new techniques are introduced. Second, the
analyst must be familiar with or be prepared to learn new
techniques with each systems analysis effort. This leaves
him with little opportunity to develop expertise in any one
of them if the situations vary too much. Third, all ratings
(technique, analyst profile, and situation profile) are
subjective and, hence, subject to error or misjudgement.
While a promising method overall, there has been a lack





Another selection method which takes into account the
varying conditions existing in each systems development
effort is the Contingency Approach, developed initially in
1978 by Naumann and Davis [Ref. 63] (see also [Ref. 18] and
[Ref. 8]) and refined a couple of times since by Davis.
[Refs. 6,13] Its most recent recent form will be discussed
here.
The basis for this approach is that the presence of
certain situational factors (contingencies) introduces
uncertainty into the information analysis process [Ref. 8:
p.274], and the level of this uncertainty can be determined
from an analysis of the situational factors; the IRD
technique which best deals with the given level of
uncertainty may then be selected. In this method the term
"uncertainty" refers to the state of knowledge of the
"real" information needs. [Ref. 18: p. 5]
Let us first examine the "situational factors"
identified by Davis:
1. Characteristics of the utilizing system (i.e., the
task)—a stable, well-defined, and well-understood system or
one with structured activities and decisions will produce
less uncertainty than an unstable and poorly understood




2. Characteristics of the proposed or existing
information or application system which supports the task—
a
system with simple requirements or one designed for clerical
support will produce less uncertainty than a system with
complex or unusual requirements or one aimed at managerial
decision-making
.
3. Characteristics of the users—systems serving only
one or a few users or those whose users understand the task
to be performed and are sophisticated with respect to
information systems development and usage will produce less
uncertainty than those of opposite characteristics.
4. Characteristics of the analysts--a highly trained
and experienced analyst who is familiar with information
systems similar to the one proposed produces less
uncertainty than an analyst with little prior training or
experience.
The IRD strategy chosen should be one of the following:
1. Asking—despite the plethora of problems associated
with this strategy, it may be effective in cases where the
users know exactly what they want; for example, Davis
mentions simple reports and listings, revisions of existing
reports, simple transaction documents such as
acknowledgements or requests for data, an ad hoc report for
a well-defined purpose [Ref. 6: p. 49], or a system designed
to meet very precise external requirements such as those
emanating from law, regulations, or higher management.
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Potential methods within this strategy include closed
questions (e.g., multiple choice), open questions (user
responds freely), brainstorming, and group consensus (e.g.,
Delphi or Nominal Group Technique).
2. Deriving from an existing information system— the
"existing system" need not be the one to be replaced; it may
also be a similar system in another organization, a
proprietary system or package, or a system described in a
published work. Data analysis, described in Chapter 5, also
comes under this category.
3. Synthesis from characteristics of the utilizing
system—this involves examining the tasks or activities to
be supported by the information system and, from that,
deriving the information requirements. Items to be analyzed
could include objectives and processes (e.g., functional
analysis, Chapter 4), decisions (e.g., decision analysis,
Chapter 5), and critical factors (e.g., CSF Approach,
Chapter 7).
4. Discovering from experimentation with an evolving
information system— for example, iterative design techniques
(prototyping or heuristic development, Chapter 8).
In selecting the appropriate strategy, the analyst
should first examine the characteristics of the four
situational factors as they apply to the systems development
effort and determine how they affect (i.e., add or reduce
uncertainty) the three "process uncertainties." These three
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process uncertainties are uncertainty with respect to
"existence and stability of a usable set of requirements ...
users 1 ability to specify requirements ... [and] ability of
analysts to elicit requirements and evaluate their
correctness and completeness." [Ref. 13: p.22]
Next, the analyst should evaluate the combined effects
of the process uncertainties on the overall requirements
uncertainty, arriving at an "estimated overall level of
requirements process uncertainty."
Finally, this estimate should be used to select a
strategy. See Figure 9-3 for the recommended strategies to
be used with different uncertainty levels. A primary and
secondary strategy may be selected. Within each one, an
associated method should be selected, with supplemental
methods chosen as desired. In other words, the analyst need
not restrict himself to one strategy/method but may use
several in conjunction with one other, the object being to
select as a secondary strategy/method one which is strong in
the areas in which the primary is weak.
The Contingency Approach is intuitively appealing
despite the fact that it, like the Situational Perspective,
is based almost totally on subjective appraisals which may
be inaccurate, and is perhaps more practical to implement












Deriving from existing system
Synthesis from utilizing system
Discovering from experimentation
Figure 9-3: Selection of an IRD Strategy
Source: Adapted from [Ref. 13]
Other, more theoretical discussions of selection
methods were published by Bariff [Ref. 64] and Dhar and
Davis. [Ref. 5 ]
In summary, it should be apparent that no IRD technique
is the "one best way" of determining information
requirements and that there must be a framework for
evaluating the available methods and choosing the best for
the specific situation. This chapter contains two possible
frameworks, and no IRA effort should be undertaken without
reference to one of them, or at least something similar.
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X. USER SELF-DETERMINATION OF NEEDS
If it is so difficult for MIS designers to determine
the information needs of the users, why not let the users do
it themselves? This chapter shall offer three possible
solutions to the IRD problem involving user self-
determination of needs. The first is a popular method,
currently implemented in numerous organizations; the second
is a method proposed in the literature, the extent of its
implementation is unknown; and the third is an original
proposal of this author.
A. USER PROJECT TEAMS
This methodology involves the use of an MIS project
team composed almost exclusively of users. The key position
of Project Manager, especially, is filled by someone from
user management. DP personnel are assigned to do the
technical portions (program design and coding) and there is
usually one analyst to act as an advisor during the
requirements analysis phase but the rest of the team is made
up of users. In this way, not only are the users totally
involved, but they are directly responsible for the success
or failure of the system. Ideally, users will be assigned
full-time to the project team (usually on a rotational
basis). It is absolutely essential that such an endeavor
have the total support of top management.
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The difficulty with this technique is the disruption it
causes to the users' normal jobs. If assignments are full-
time, some assurance must be provided to the individuals
concerned that their career progression will not be hampered
by such an assignment. If users work on the project part-
time, the conflict with other duties may cause the project
team members to be somewhat ineffective as their efforts are
diluted.
Given the proper organizational climate, this method is
one of the best available for successful development of
relatively large management information systems.
B. "TROJAN HORSE" STRATEGY
Proposed by Synnott and Gruber [Ref. 65], this
strategy involves providing "gifts" in the form of systems
professionals to user divisions. Synnott and Gruber
explain, "Trojan horses quickly learn the business and
promote systems solutions to business problems." [Ref. 65:
p. 80] While originally designed as an information
technology penetration strategy, its use can be applied to
IRA as well, though in a slightly abridged form.
In this strategy, the Information Systems Division
transfers a systems professional into the user department
requiring the system. He then becomes a user himself. Over
time, as he learns the business, the analyst-turned-user
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gains an awareness of information systems needs. He should
then be able to specify those needs without, being
susceptible to the usual problems associated with "asking" a
user about his needs (because of his systems background).
As with user project teams, top management support is
essential. The main problem with the technique is that the
individual transferred is likely to be concerned about his
career progression. Hence, satisfactory arrangements must
be agreed upon by all concerned before such a transfer takes
place.
C. INFORMATION CENTER
The Information Center concept was developed by IBM
around mid-1 980 and has since caught on with tremendous
success. It was developed in response to the growing
backlog of application development requests from which most,
if not all, Information Systems departments are suffering.
The idea is that if the users can do some of the minor work
by themselves, without having to wait two years or more for
the IS department to get around to it, they can benefit from
the productivity increase provided by the minor application
much sooner. This translates to overall improved user
productivity.
The I/C provides the user with a terminal, a consultant
for training and assistance, and software packages for
solving his problem, such as a data manipulation package,
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report generation package, query package, etc. L. W. Hammond
explains:
The objective of an I/C is to provide users access to data
on their own terms so that they can solve their own
business problems. [Ref. 66: p. 133]
He goes on to emphasize that:
The type of work the I/C is intended to support is the
short job, the one-time query, the simple report, the
minor change, etc., and not the work that requires the
discipline of formal project development procedures. It
is not a replacement for a way around the longer schedules
usually required to develop a system . [Ref. 66: p. 134]
While this is valid in regard to the original I/C concept,
it seems that many management-oriented information systems
and decision support systems could be more easily and
cheaply implemented by the user himself using the I/C than
by the traditional systems development approach. What this
user-developed system would cost in processing inefficiency
would probably be much less than what a full-fledged
development effort would cost, even for a small system. The
author believes that the I/C concept should and will move in
this direction in the future. Mollen and Bakshi, from IBM,
report results supporting this contention obtained from
certain organizations that have implemented Information
Centers [Ref 67: p. 7]:
1. IBM Canada, Ltd. reported that about 50% of the





2. The American Automobile Association of Michigan
claims that, "'Soon, our professional programmers will be
doing only the difficult jobs, the big online programs, and
everything else will be done by the users themselves. 1"
Part II will report on a survey conducted of
organizations having an Information Center to further
determine if industrial I/C usage supports the belief
mentioned above. The results did not indicate unanimous
support, but did indicate a sufficient amount to establish
that the potential for such an evolution exists.
There are problems with user-developed systems, to be
sure, not the least of which is that they tend to be
individual user-specific with limited inter-departmental
applicability. This may be a just tough enough problem
that user-developed systems will never be in the majority,





IRD TECHNIQUE SURVEY AND CONCLUSIONS
The second part of this thesis deals with the current
application of the IRD techniques discussed in Part I to
actual systems development. Chapter 11 reports on the
results of an industry survey taken to determine which
techniques are being used in practice, Chapter 12 comments





A series of generally unstructured interviews was
conducted with officials from several organizations during
the months of March and April, 1983. These interviews, some
done in person and some done by phone, involved individuals
of varying positions in fifteen organizations of different
types. Appendix B lists the positions of the individuals
interviewed, the type of organization, and the size of their
Data Processing effort.
Although the results of this survey are considered too
unreliable for any sort of rigorous statistical analysis,
some useful information may still be derived from the data
collected. The remainder of this chapter attempts to do just
that; Chapter 12 will discuss deficiencies of the survey and
recommendations for improvement.
In each of the unstructured interviews, a series of
questions were asked with the interviewee free to expound as
much as he wished on each. Sometimes clarifying questions
were asked to sharpen understanding of certain points raised
by the individual, but generally he was free to address each
issue as he wished. Appendix C contains a list of the
questions used during the interviews.
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A. RESULTS OF THE INTERVIEWS
A "formal" IRD method is one in which the steps or
activities involved are specified in advance and
intentionally followed by a systems analyst. An "informal"
method is one in which there are no clear and concrete steps
to be followed. There is no conscious effort to use any
certain technique; rather the individual analyst proceeds in
a "seat of the pants" fashion, based on experience or
intuition as to how the needs analysis should be conducted.
All of the "Basics" in Chapter 3 may be components of
informal techniques. "Ask and Analyze" and "Functional
Analysis" in Chapter 4 are informal (Miller's and Sisson's
methods are formal versions of the otherwise informal
technique of Functional Analysis). Paper Simulation and the
Data Base Approach are also informal. All remaining
approaches discussed are considered formal.
Based on this distinction, ten of the fifteen
organizations studied used informal IRD methods. Of the
five using formal procedures, three involved the use of some
form of user project teams who held overall responsibility
for the success of the project. One of these three also
used some prototyping. Of the ten organizations using
informal procedures, it appeared that only one occasionally,
or had in the past, used a formal approach; namely,
prototyping. Appendix D presents a summary of approaches
used and type (formal or informal). The classification of
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approaches as to type was a subjective one, based on the
author's understanding of the method described by the
interviewee. Interestingly, in twelve of the fifteen cases,
the individuals claimed their techniques to be successful in
accurately determining users' information requirements. Of
the three remaining, two were using methods never before
tried in their organization and the projects were not yet
complete so no evaluation of success could be made, and the
third realized that asking the users what they needed was
not always successful unless the results of such a process
were cycled back to the users for modification and approval.
When discussing weaknesses of the methods used, only
five of fifteen interviewees acknowledged that their
techniques suffered from user-analyst communication problems
or the inability of users to articualte their needs
accurately. This was unexpectedly low in light of the
problems discussed in Chapter 2. There are two possible
reasons for such a percentage: (1) the participants
interviewed do not realize, or do not accept, the fact that
their methods are less than totally reliable, or (2) the
situation surrounding the system development effort is such
that it produces very low uncertainty (in reference to the
Contingency Approach). Of these five, one felt that the
solution to the problem was to add new analysts to the
project, one thought requirements validation was sufficient
to make up for the weakness, two offered no way around the
TOO

problem (the solution is just to do the best they can), and
the fifth seemed to indicate that a poor statement of
requirements was the users' problem to solve. This leads
one to believe that there is not a wide recognition in
industry that the IRD problem is significant, or even
exists.
In the area of user resistance to IRD techniques, ten
reported meeting some level of resistance in most cases.
Four of them said this resistance was mostly centered in the
lower level employees. Of the five firms reporting no
resistance, one was using the user project team concept and
one a "pseudo" user project team concept, both of which hold
the user responsible for the success of the project. The
other two organizations using this approach did encounter
some resistance. In both of these, one of the users'
complaints was that they felt uncomfortable in their new
role and did not know what to do. In the other cases, the
most common cause of resistance identified was that the
users felt they were simply too busy to be bothered with
determining information requirements.
McKeen, Naumann, and Davis observed that "the method
for determining information requirements employed by a
practitioner may be used either bacause the analyst has had
experience with only one method or because the selected
method has worked successfully before for systems of this
type.... In short, current practice is based upon
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experience and intuition—not theory or empirical research."
[Ref. 18: p. 3] This statement was tested in the survey and
it was found that two-thirds of the individuals interviewed
knew of no IRD methods other than the one (or ones) they
were currently using. Of the five who had tried different
techniques, only one had intentionally tested and evaluated
multiple techniques. The others merely evolved to a method
incorporating greater user involvement, and the fifth one
changed to an approach requiring less time due to a
constraint in that area. It appears, then, that McKeen,
Naumann, and Davis were correct.
King and Cleland have commented that, "Rather than
creating an information system to serve an existing
organizational system, [the analyst] should attempt to
influence the restructuring of the decision-making process
so that the MIS may be oriented toward the support of a
more nearly 'optimal' process." [Ref. 38: p. 292] Believing
that the MIS should never attempt to impose a change on the
manager's decision process but, rather, should support that
which exists, the next question was designed to reveal how
widespread was the view that an MIS should attempt to alter
the decision process. It turns out to be very widespread.
Every individual to whom this question was posed replied
that they did, in fact, attempt to change the manager's
decision process. The intent was not to force the manager
to conform to a systems-oriented approach, but rather to
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optimize the decision by allowing the manager to include
information that was previously unavailable in a useful
form.
In Chapter 1 , it was discussed that faulty information
requirements were one of the major causes of MIS failure.
In an attempt to gain evidence confirming this, the next
question inquired as to whether any of the interviewees had
experienced unsuccessful MIS's, and if so, what were the
causes. Three of the survey participants reported they had
never had a system failure (a "failure" was defined as a
system which was not used after implementation or one with
which the users were dissatisfied). Of the twelve who did,
only half laid the blame on inaccurate or incomplete user
requirements. Other reasons given included the assignment
to the job of an untrained analyst, insufficiently motivated
users who refused to take the time to learn the system or to
update the data in the system, and other similar ones.
These responses were surprising in view of the discussion in
Chapter 1 , but in retrospect, the question posed was a
difficult one to answer for two reasons. First, no system
ever meets the users' needs the first time but gradually
attains that objective only after being modified and
refined. Second, over time, the users of the system change,
and the situation and environment in which the system
operates changes. If the system does not also change, even
the best is bound to fall into disuse or will eventually
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cease to satisfy the needs of the users. Hence, it is
difficult to adjudge a system as a "failure" or
"unsuccessful," and even more difficult to determine the
exact cause of failure.
Prior to conducting this study, it had been the
author's belief that the practical application of much of
the academic research in IRA was quite limited. The research
was designed, therefore, to discover how many IRA
practitioners in industry were aware of the different
techniques developed over the years through academic
research. So, each interviewee was confronted with the
techniques listed in Appendix C, question 14 (each of which
were discussed in Part I except for the Infological
Development and the REP Test which were omitted due to their
complexity and relatively light treatment in the
literature). The responses are tabulated in Appendix E.
If we consider each cell in the table an "opportunity"
for a practitioner to be aware of an IRD technique, then
out of 224 opportunities, only 39 instances of awareness
were found (17.4%). This seems to reveal a rather large gap
between IRA research and practical applications. Ahituv,
Munro, and Wand also noticed this problem, identifying a
"need to bridge the gap between the abundant conceptual
literature on the one hand and practical applications of IA
[Information Analysis] activities on the other." [Ref. 20:
p. 144] This gap exists despite the fact that some of the
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techniques (most notably decision analysis, data analysis,
and paper simulation) are very similar to techniques .in use,
though informally, in many of the organizations surveyed.
The similarity may be due to the fact that these three
techniques are a logical outgrowth of the currently accepted
undesirability of accepting users* statements of needs at
face value. In other words, these techniques were perceived
to be useful by analysts apparently using their own
intuition, as opposed to analysts who were knowledgeable of
IRA research results.
Another observation that may be made is that some form
of iterative design technique is being used in many cases,
although the formal procedures of neither prototyping nor
heuristic development are being followed in most of them.
The researcher tends to suspect that many, although
certainly not all, of the individuals who listed
"prototyping" or "heuristic development" as one of their
techniques were attempting to use a more traditional
approach but were forced to repeatedly refine their systems
upon discovering that those systems did not satisfy the
users. There is no hard data to support this suspicion, but
an intuitive evaluation of the comments made by many of the
interviewees points in this direction.
The final area of the survey to be reviewed deals with
the use of Information Centers. Many of the participants
105

reported that their organization had no l/C, so some
additional firms, not otherwise a part of the survey, were
contacted for information. Of fifteen I/C's contacted, only
three (20%) reported any large-scale system development
taking place. The rest reported developing mostly one-time,
ad hoc reports as well as some continuing small-scale,
intra-departmental reporting systems. Further, only four
individuals (26.7%) foresee any full-scale development in
the future, and one of these believed that only Analysis and
Reporting type systems, rather than Transaction Systems,
would be built in this manner. Only two of the four felt
that the l/C would eventually take over all systems
development from the IS Department.
The reasons most often given for retaining full-scale
systems development within the IS Department were:
1. Users do not have the expertise to build large-scale
transaction systems or reporting systems that cross
departmental lines;
2. User-friendly software tools used in the I/C's
such as FOCUS, RAMIS II, etc., are too inefficient
to be used for large production systems; and
3. Most users simply do not want to get involved with
full-scale systems development.
Drawing any conclusions from the above is
exceedingly difficult, since the comments made are
subjective opinions. Also, the Information Center
concept is still only about three years old and, hence,
has a lot of growing and evolving yet to do. But the
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author stands firm in his belief that in the future,
more and more management-oriented information systems
and decision support systems will be developed by the
users themselves using Information Centers, thus
eliminating the IRD problem in those cases.
107

XII. EVALUATION OF THE SURVEY
As was briefly alluded to early in the last chapter,
the results of the survey undertaken as part of this
project, while perhaps interesting, are of questionable
validity. In this chapter, we shall discuss each of the
four flaws which became evident in retrospect and will then
suggest possible alternate methods for conducting a similar
study.
A. COMMUNICATIONS
Communications between interviewer and interviewee were
flawed for four basic reasons:
1. The terminology used in the questions revealed
itself to be very confusing. The DP world has so many
different meanings for the same term and so many different
terms for the same concept, that the interviewees often had
difficulty understanding what the researcher was asking.
For example, many of the participants misunderstood the
terms "Management Information System," "Decision Support
System," "Management-Oriented Information System," and
"Transaction Processing System." Similarly, most of the
interviewees misinterpreted the names of many of the
published IRD techniques about which they were questioned
(see question 14, Appendix B). For instance, many of the
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participants are familiar with the word "heuristic," namely,
"trial and error", and assumed that "heuristic development"
merely referred to a situation where the system was modified
if not correct the first time. While this is the basic
premise behind the concept of "heuristic development," it is
not consistent with the formal description of the method
provided by Wetherbe. [Ref . 61 ] Also, in more than one
case, the Nominal Group Technique was mistakenly assumed to
be any method which involves a group meeting to discuss
requirements, and the Contingency Approach was interpreted
as reflecting the organization's plans for dealing with
physical disasters involving the computer system.
The result of these misinterpretations was that, often,
participants claimed they used a particular method when in
fact they did not. Some of these instances were uncovered
during the interviews and the issues clarified, but it seems
certain that many were not.
2. Many of the responses received are incomplete and
oversimplified to the point that important information is
missing. This may be due to the fact that, quite often, the
individuals interviewed were unsure of the level of detail
desired in their answers. Consequently, they summarized
their explanations and just presented the salient features
of their IRD methods, thus omitting a great deal of valuable
information. Partly contributing to this problem was the
time limit of the interviews. Though no explicit limit was
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set, there is a practical limitation on the amount of time a
manager will take away from his work to participate in an
interview from which he or she will derive no benefit.
3. Much of the information received during the
interviews is tainted by the bias of the managers involved.
Recall that the main thrust of this paper is toward
management -oriented information systems as opposed to
transaction processing systems. In industry, however, the
great majority of applications systems currently in place
are transaction processing systems. Hence, when the
managers interviewed spoke about requirements analysis
during systems development, they were really addressing
these issues in the context of transaction processing
systems rather than management-oriented information systems,
despite the fact that the managerial orientation of the
survey was explained beforehand. Alloway and Quillard
identified this problem in the report of a survey published
in 1 982. They observed:
I/S policies and procedures, organizational structure, and
expertise in developing applications are dominated by
transaction processors. [Ref. 68: p.10]
They further point out:
In most companies the established standard procedures for
needs identification, project prioritization, and project
selection are the result of institutionalized transaction
processing experience. [Ref. 68: p. 20]
4. Having never participated in a systems development
effort and having never experienced first-hand the IRD
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problem, a total grasp of the issues involved was missing.
A secondary objective of this study was that it would be an
educational tool to provide the researcher with an
understanding of this apparently problematic area.
Therefore, when confronted with DP professionals who also
seemed to not understand the problem and who requested a
clearer explanation of what was wanted, a clarification was
not always satisfactorily provided.
B. PARTICIPANTS
When planning this survey, it was assumed that the
appropriate person to speak with would be an organization's
lead, or senior, systems analyst. This seemed to be the
best place to find an individual who had the "big picture"
while at the same time was not so far removed from the
"action" that he or she would be unfamiliar with the IRD
techniques used. Much to the researcher's surprise, few
people understood what was meant by the terms "lead systems
analyst" or "senior systems analyst." It was therefore
decided to move up the organizational ladder and look for
the systems development manager or someone of a similar
title. As shown in Appendix B, the participants often ended
up being inappropriate for the survey. Most participants
appear to have been too far removed from the actual
information requirements determination activity, despite the
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fact that, when setting up the interview, assurances were
received that he or she was the proper person to interview.
C. SYSTEM TYPES
Once again, recall that this study intended to focus on
management -oriented information systems. When arranging
interviews, interest was expressed in those types of systems
as opposed to transaction processing systems. In many of
the cases, however, it became evident at some point during
the interview that the organization, or manager, involved
did not deal to an adequate extent with management-oriented
systems. Hence, much of the data collected is inapplicable
to the type of systems being studied and therefore is
invalid.
D. RESEARCH PRACTICES
Due to a lack of training and experience in conducting
studies such as this, the approach to the problem was
inappropriate. Because of the way the interviews were
structured, the types of questions that were asked, and an
inability to clarify what was being sought, the resulting
responses are difficult to compare since they are based on
different levels of understanding and interpretation on the
part of the interviewee and different probing on the part of
the interviewer. Additionally, in each of the cases,
different I/S situations and conditions existed. Further,
the same type of information was not collected at each
112

interview. For example, due to the relatively unstructured
nature of the interview, the participants were free to
expound on each question as they wished, with very little
prompting from the interviewer. The result of this is that
just because one manager addressed a certain point and
another did not does not mean that that point applies only
in the first situation. It merely means that the point did
not come up in conversation in the second instance—it may,
however, apply equally in both cases. This makes the
drawing of any firm conclusions extremely hazardous.
E. ALTERNATE METHODS
Rather than restricting data collection efforts to
interviews, a technique of direct observation augmented by
interviews would have been much more effective. "Sitting
in" on the requirements analysis phase of a system
development process and observing first-hand which
techniques were used would have solved the problems with
communications, participants, and system types. This latter
problem could also be lessened by better screening of a
potential participating organization's systems development
projects before commencing the observation phase. Of
course, an interview with the cognizant manager beforehand
to gain his approval and support would be essential.
To eliminate the problems caused by the research
practices used, the following methodology is proposed.
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Practicing systems analysts, actively involved in the
requirements analysis phase of a system development project
should be observed and interviewed to determine what
techniques they are actually using. Whether or not they
have "heard" of one of the published techniques is not
important, because the analysts may have received informal
training on one of these techniques without being aware of
the name assigned to it by academic researchers. Therefore,
the study should involve determining the techniques used
through observation and interview, followed by an attempt to
categorize the observed techniques into one or more of the
published IRD techniques, if possible. If any of the
techniques fall into the informal, or more primitive (e.g.,
"Ask and Analyze," Chapter 4), technique categories and/or
the analyst is apparently unaware of the more formal and
higher level techniques, then an effort should be made to
find out why. For example, is his lack of sophistication
based on inadequate education, training, or experience? Or
does he use the observed techniques based on an informed and
deliberate choice, made after considering all the relevant
factors (Chapter 9)?
A more theoretical question may be: does the problem
lie with the IRA researchers and institutions (such as MIT's
Center for Information Systems Research [CISR] or the
University of Minnesota's Management Information Systems
Research Center [MISRC]) for developing IRD methods
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inappropriate for practical application? Has there been any
effort to establish a mechanism for transferring the
knowledge of IRD techniques to industry?
These procedures would have to be applied to at least
25-30 organizations so that the study would be statistically
significant.
Admittedly, this proposed methodology would be very
expensive in both time and money, and for this reason it
would not have been possible within the constraints existing
in the environment in which this study was performed.
However, this is what is necessary to produce valid and
significant results.
F. SUMMARY
The value of the project just completed is as a pilot
study for the type of research just proposed. It has
established the impracticality of using a pure interview
approach and has helped clarify and solidify the areas of
importance and specific objectives of such a project.
Therefore, a follow-on research project is necessary to
determine if, in fact, systems analysts are using the IRD
techniques found in the literature and if not, why not.
Such research is necessary because the results will no doubt
prove useful in the future reduction or elimination of MIS's




Despite the problems associated with this survey, it is
still useful in that it provides us with a general, though
not entirely accurate, indication of the current state of
Information Requirements Analysis as practiced in industry.
This indication is that there is a large gap between the IRD
techniques discussed in the MIS literature and the IRD
techniques applied in industry.
Why does this gap exist? Ahituv et al. lay the blame
on the same problem identified by Alloway and Quillard
mentioned in the previous chapter. They explain:
most systems analysts have been involved in
developing information systems for the operational levels
of the organization. These applications...tend to be
structured so that most of the information requirements
are obvious. As a result, systems analysts do not always
perceive the importance of the IA [Information Analysis]
phase when faced with less-structured situations. [Ref.
20: p.1 44]
Another reason for this gap is the lack of education of
practicing analysts in the field of IRA. The only survey
participant who was familiar with a significant number of
the published IRD techniques explained that he had gained
this knowledge from reading on his own. This is
commendable, but it is unfortunate that only one in fifteen
has taken this extra step.
How can this gap be bridged? Ahituv et al. offer two
ways. First, more experimental work on IRD techniques is
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necessary to determine how different methods perform under
different situations. Second, the results of this research
must be translated into language that is understood by
systems analysts in industry. The paucity of IRA
information in DP management periodicals is astounding. It
seems to be confined to academic journals where managers and
systems analysts are not likely to see it. It is essential
that discussion of IRD techniques migrate to publications
more widely read by the people who need to know about those
techniques.
Additionally, most managers and analysts are not
interested in theory, but rather in step-by-step, cookbook
approaches to accomplish a task. Hence, Ahituv et al. argue
that "structured methodologies based on the research results
should be developed." [Ref. 20: p. 144] Education of systems
analysts in these structured methodologies is vital if we
expect use of the methodologies to spread. All formal data
processing educational programs (at vocational schools,
colleges, and universities) include a course in IRA and that
continuing education be provided in the form of seminars.
The basic goal of any program to bridge the conceptual
literature-practical application gap should be to
ultimately enlarge the "problem space" of systems analysts
so that they can intelligently survey the situation, make an
informed and deliberate choice of what they believe to be
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the optimum out of a large repertoire of possible
approaches, and then competently determine the users 1 true
requirements. We must achieve this goal if we wish to take
full advantage of the capabilities of today's (and





ASPECTS OF TAGGART AND THARP ' S IRA TECHNIQUE FRAMEWORK
1. Evaluation criteria used ; evaluation scope
encompassing the analysis phase as well as including
operational and technical criteria.
2- Information characteristics ; recognize key
characteristics of information and their impact on the cost
of information needs.
3. Information need scope : recognize the current scope
of need satisfaction with the implied potential for
expansion in the universe of managers' information need.
4. Degree of sophistication : evaluationary expansion
through information systems stages implies increasing
sophistication in requirements analysis approaches.
5. Decision process : recognize the need to support the
information requirements of the intelligence and design
phases as well as the choice phases of the decision process.
6. Dec is ion- ma king hierarchy : nonprogrammed decision
type activity and higher levels in the decision hierarchy
require more sophisticated information support which should
be considered in requirements analysis.
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7. The decision maker : the decision maker as a human
information processor exhibits varying degrees of ability on
several behavioral dimensions.
8. Organizational environment : the simplicity and
complexity of information needs depends on the stability of
the organization's external environment and internal
structure.
9. Organizational subsystems : a generalized scheme for
organizational subsystems provides the analyst with a
broadly applicable basis for need determination.
10. Management function and level : the character of
information requirements varies with different combinations
of management function and level.



































































12. Head, Require- Military DP Service Facility Medium
ments Analysis
and Design Division
13. Deputy Director U. S. Government Agency Medium
of Information Mgt
Division
14. Manager of Sys- Forest Products Manufacturer Medium
terns Development
15. Vice President Bank X-Large
for Data Systems
Design and Support
* These organizations sell their systems development
services to outside organizations; hence, the size is based
on approximate yearly revenues vice budget and a different





1. What techniques do you use (or are used here) for
determining information requirements?
2. How successful are they?
3. What are the weaknesses of your methods and how do you
make up for them?
4. Do you meet any resistance from the users in the use of
this technique?
5. Do you have experience with any other techniques? If
so, what were the results of using those techniques?
6. (If answer to #5 was "yes") Why do you prefer your
methods over these other techniques?
7. Do you try to improve the decision-making process in any
way when developing the MIS?
8. Have there been any MIS developed that were unsuccess-
ful?
9. Do you have an Information Center?
If "yes":
10. Do you consider it successful?
11. Is it used solely for special, one-time, and ad hoc
reports or is it used for full-scale systems development as
well?
12. Do you foresee it being used for systems development in
the future?
13. Will it replace traditional MIS departments or will they
work together?
















k. Critical Success Factors Approach
1. Protocol Analysis
m. Delphi Method
n. Critical Incident Technique
o. REP Test Methodology (Role Construct Repertory Test)




TECHNIQUES DESCRIBED IN INTERVIEWS
INTERVIEW FORMAL ( F
)
NUMBER TECHNIQUE INFORMAL ( I
1 Look at existing system, organizational I
goals, current information inputs to
decisions.
2 Acquire knowledge of business through I
involvement and conduct interviews.
3 Ask, document examination, look at I
existing system.
4 STRATUS system development method: user F
project teams.
5 Ask, or may be found already specified I
in RFP
6 If scope is large, study info flow and I
managerial objectives; if scope narrow,
start with something simple and evolve.
7 Interview; familiarization with user I
environment; geographically dispersed
users just write down requirements and
send to head office.
8 Interview between systems analyst and user I/F
liason personnel; some prototyping on short
projects.
9 SDM-70 systems development method; user F
project teams.
10 Pseudo-user project teams: requirements I
analysis delegated back to systems personnel
who ask the users about their needs and then
iteratively refine those needs.
11 Ask; sometimes group meetings. I
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12 Ask; some direct observation; user
reviews of requirements.
13 Questionnaires to be followed by group
discussion/evaluation.
14 METHOD 1 systems development method;
direct observation of what users do,
then interviews to refine and validate.




















n. Crit. Incid. Tech.
o. REP Test
p. Data Base Approach
PARTICIPANT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14 15
• + * • 3 • • 1 3 • 1 • •
1 + • 1 3 3 3 • • • +
1
+
• * • * * • * • • + • * •
2
1 3 1 e 3 2 § @ 1 § e 3
1 @ 1 § e e
2 + *
3
3 1 3 1 1
3 +
1
+ + 1 +
Key: = Never heard of it
1 = Heard of it but never used it
2 = Used it once or twice
3 = Use quite often
+= Never heard of it by that name, but a similar concept has
been used once or twice informally
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* = Never heard of it by that name, but a similar concept is
used frequently informally
@ = Heard of it, and sometimes use an informal version
NOTE: Interview #9 has been omitted because the interviewee
was a user on the project team, not a DP professional and,
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